Policy and Practice Summary

In it for the long haul? Lessons on peacebuilding in South Sudan

Juba/London, July 2018

This policy and practice summary accompanies a longer report which identifies overarching lessons contributing to the effectiveness of peacebuilding in South Sudan. It aims to provide some guidance for those wishing to understand or support peacebuilding in South Sudan, particularly donor agencies and practitioners within the peacebuilding sector.

1. Why we should learn from the ‘local’ and engage in multi-level approaches

Since 2013, South Sudan has collapsed into civil war, with widespread insecurity. Tens of thousands of people have been killed, and millions are displaced and in need of humanitarian support.

Since and during the years of civil war which led to independence from Sudan in 2011, elite power-sharing between armed belligerents and other attempts to broker a national political solution have not resulted in peace. Instead, political processes have risked causing harm by exacerbating competition and deepening division. The failure of the national political leadership and international mediation to bring sustainable peace has brought renewed interest from donors in learning from the local. This is a welcome shift in South Sudan because alliances exist between both local and national actors who ‘co-produce’ violence and peace.

‘Local’ conflicts and local actors are defined here as those that manifest or operate within discrete sub-national contexts, with geographic zones according to political, economic or security interests, whose porous ‘boundaries’ are also discerned, often by local actors themselves, according to specific cultural characteristics and history. Local or sub-national contexts are often overlapping and interact horizontally and vertically, woven together to form the complex fabric of South Sudan. In addition, ‘local’ does not imply non-involvement of high level actors or interest (though this may be the case), nor a limit to their importance relative to national peace processes. Therefore, it can be unhelpful to think in distinct and separate terms of ‘local-level conflict’ and ‘national-level conflict’.

Yet, high-level events such as the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan and the design of other high-level processes still do not adequately reflect local realities or the interlinkages between the interests of national and local actors.

Effective strategies to build peace require a supportive environment across all levels – connecting high-level strategies with the realities of multi-level conflict in South Sudan to provide openings for more transformative change that connects the grassroots, middle level leaders and elites, and deals with diverse patterns of decades old grievances as well as contemporary challenges. Furthermore, while external support for peacebuilding has an essential role to play, South Sudanese ownership of peace initiatives is critical.
Based on learning from previous local peace building evaluations and studies in South Sudan together with new field research, and informed by the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) guidelines on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding; and the McKinsey 7 business management model, this report asks: are we investing enough in understanding and working with local actors? What can we learn from the local to inform the design of national strategies for peace?

Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 and the UN Sustaining Peace resolutions highlight the importance of ensuring responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels as well as the substantial role of civil society in sustaining peace.

This report identifies ten principles or guiding statements for donors and peacebuilders to inform peacebuilding choices and foster a multi-level approach to peace based on local practices and realities. We hope that this will contribute to informing more comprehensive approaches to multi-level peace in South Sudan and elsewhere, and feed into international policy processes such as SDG16 and the UN Sustaining Peace resolutions, as well as providing lessons for similar contexts in other countries.

South Sudan – key facts

- It is the world’s newest nation, gaining independence from Sudan in July 2011.
- It has some of the worst development and humanitarian indicators in the world, but has substantial reserves of oil.
- Civil war started in 2013 when a political crisis led to division within the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement which escalated into armed conflict.
- One in every three people, or 4.3 million people, have been displaced by fighting so far (UN OCHA).

Peacebuilding lessons from outside South Sudan

- Peace is an ongoing process: Conflict never ends, it changes and evolves. The aim is to manage and transform it peacefully.
- An ‘urban bias’ among international and national elites obscures conflict dynamics. Analysis tends to focus on political and military elites as the sole authors of violence and peace.
- Alliances exist between local and national actors, who ‘co-produce’ violence, and local variations are important.
- Infrastructure for peace must be multi-level. Building peace in modern conflicts calls for long-term commitment to establishing a supportive environment for peace across all levels of society.
- Both local leadership and external contributions are important. Peace interventions should empower the resources for reconciliation from within a society and maximise contribution from outside.
- Local actors can contribute to national peace. Strategically linked local peace work can contribute effectively to national peace under certain conditions.
- Peace lasts longer when women are included in the process. Recognise the importance of women’s involvement in peace and security issues.

Source: literature review, see p.16 of the report for more
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2. What we found out

Findings are presented in ten principles described to be particularly valuable in the South Sudanese context by 50 experienced local and international peace practitioners interviewed for the longer report.

Principle 1: Peace is a long-term transformative process

Situate initiatives in a long-term perspective

“Peace... can take three months or five years, you don’t stop, you go on, and on, until there is a sense of justice.” – Reverend Peter Tibi, Africa Inland Church and Director of CBO, Reconcile

- ‘Peace is a process’ has entered the lexicon of peacebuilding but too many peace initiatives still focus on the idea of a peace ‘conference’ or one-off intervention rather than a ‘peace process’. For instance, the church-led Wunlit ‘People-to-People’ Process, which ended fighting between Nuer and Dinka on the Nile’s West Bank in 1999, was conceived as long-term from the beginning – the preparations alone took eight months – though it is frequently discussed as if it were a single event.

- Isolated ‘peace’ events can do more harm than good, setting up poorly researched, impossible to implement agreements. In contrast, the South Sudan Council of Churches’ Action Plan for Peace is a multi-level peace framework which perceives its time frame as multi-generational.

- Daily conflict management programmes work best when they take account of the long-term need for both peace and justice, though a project based on accommodating short-term and pragmatic interests can be a vital component or entry point.

- For example, facilitating the flow of goods between two communities can improve livelihoods and reduce security risks in the short term and respond to local conceptions of ‘peace’. At the same time, risks such as rent-capture, or market dominance, affecting the long term should be identified and mitigated.

Selected lessons from past local peacebuilding literature in South Sudan

- Local peacebuilding is no substitute for a national peace agreement, but the stability of a national process depends on addressing local disputes.

- Indigenous traditions are key in the power of local processes to transform conflict, but these are poorly understood.

- Peace is a process – activity focused on isolated ‘peace meetings’ can undermine the potential of local peacebuilding.

- Theories of change were not based on evidence from within South Sudan but tended to be cut and pasted from elsewhere.

- Resources were not allocated according to local realities but for ease or speed.

- Funding mechanisms were not sufficiently flexible to respond to changes in political or security dynamics.

Source: literature review, see p.22 of the report for more

Turkana family at an important watering place for Turkana and Toposa cattle, at the South Sudan-Kenya border, February 2017.
**Policy and practice implication:** Donors should ensure programmes and mechanisms are given adequate timeframes, and develop mechanisms to support programme design as such including working with practitioners to develop appropriate monitoring and evaluation support. A long-term perspective should inform both short and long-term change strategies and decision-making.

**Principle 2: Understand, respond, interact**

*Invest in and respond to multi-level conflict analysis*

“Donors need to be working with the reality, but before any consultations take place, the die is too often cast and the priorities are forgone conclusions.” – Ferdinand von Habsburg-Lothringen, Senior Advisor, South Sudan Council of Churches

• The principle of good conflict analysis is well established. The practice less so. This should not be seen as a tick box, but something that requires investment, relationship building, and long-term analysis.

• Situations change over time, sometimes quickly, and blueprint programming is unlikely to bear fruit. Ongoing conflict analysis requires adaption and changing modes of operation to ensure deeper engagement with community actors, building in uncertainty to project timelines, amending methodologies, pushing for flexibility in budgets, and acknowledging failures.

• The conflict analysis underlying programme design should also seek to answer questions at multiple levels, geographic zones and cultural contexts. How does conflict in one local area link to actors in other areas? What national players are relevant to local dynamics? These questions ensure that the aggregation of local peace initiatives will ‘Do No Harm’. It should not be assumed that local peace efforts will naturally ‘add up’ to broader peace.

• **For example,** the provision of support in two different local contexts can further entrench opposing sides in a broader civil war as is arguably the case today with interventions in Akobo and Lakes States.

**Policy and practice implication:** Donors need to build adaptiveness and flexibility into funding mechanisms and include accountability measures to ensure programmes are responsive to changing dynamics. Likewise, donors need to invest in ongoing conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity that take into account how sub-national peace initiatives interact horizontally and vertically.

**Principle 3: Peace is a security issue and needs a security guarantee**

*Be prepared to engage with security actors*

“If you end with an agreement and there is no sanction to maintain security except trust, you will have a rod for your own back.” – Richard King, CEO, Concordis International

• Engaging with critical actors also means engaging with security actors who may be a critical ingredient in managing conflict. This may include army, militia, armed community members, or high-level actors to facilitate security guarantees.

• **For example,** in Yiel East, the return of cattle following raiding between Ciec, Atuot and Alab is only possible with the participation and buy-in of the armed gelweng/community police, a semi-autonomous group who assist in collecting stolen livestock and bringing criminals into the custody of the state.

• **Similarly,** along the border of Akobo and Ethiopia in early 2017, the establishment of a new Ethiopian Border Force immediately intervened in cross-border cattle raiding between Jikany and Lou Nuer, ending two years of tit-for-tat thefts and abductions.

• **Likewise,** in 2006, PAX started support to a Cross-Border Peace and Sports programme to train young warriors and former combatants in conflict transformation skills, and to use sports for relationship building. This built confidence and an important cross-border conference was possible involving 500 people.
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• **Policy and practice implication:** Peacebuilders need to go beyond civilian stakeholders and engage security actors. While communities may distrust their state authorities and security forces, programmes need to take their strategic role into account and navigate the balance between security personnel and community needs.

**Principle 4: Strategically include both ‘key’ and ‘more’ people**

*Engage both leaders and citizens in an inclusive approach*

> “You will never be able to include all actors, but you need to find the critical ones, whether a women’s group or an army general.” – Isaac Kenyi, Catholic Church Justice and Peace Desk

• Inclusivity is the strategic act of sequencing the engagement of ‘key people’ and ‘more people’ – everyone matters in a transformational peace process that relies on both providing security and an experience of justice. This includes the involvement of women, young men and other groups that may be marginalised, which can make or break peace processes.

• Depending on the context, this may begin with elite negotiations, back and forth shuttling between key individuals, mass mobilisations, issue-based negotiation, community campaigns, advocacy or reconciliation rituals. However, a successful initiative will likely involve all these kinds of activities, appropriately sequenced or in parallel.

• Sub-national contexts may be ‘local’ but key people need to be part of the process, whether they are very hard to reach, elites in other parts of South Sudan, or elsewhere in the world. The same is true for high-level dialogues, which may need to reach out to lower level actors.

• **For example,** Mak Choul, Akobo Peace Commissioner, described three stages in a traditional community reconciliation process: “The Murle youth [‘more people’] will put a white flag at the border, when we see it, it is the Paramount Chiefs who communicate with each other. They sit with the three border chiefs of each side and agree if there will be peace [‘key people’] and inform the commissioner, then we invite representatives of the community for input and reconciliation [‘more people’] before peace is done”.

• **Policy and practice implication:** Peacebuilding theories of change must meaningfully seek to enable interaction between the ‘more’ and the ‘key’ people (specific to the context) expected to lead to long-term change and engage an inclusive approach to ensure that ‘peace’ is meaningful to the diverse range of stakeholders. The engagement of women and youth is key – how this is done should be guided by context.

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**Examples of bottom-up peace practice in South Sudan (early and late 1990s)**

• **Peace markets** at Rubh Ngai (Dinka, Misseriya and Nuer) and Abien Dau (Dinka and Misseriya).

• **Joint courts** at Warawar and Gok Machar, Northern Bahr al Ghazal (Dinka, Misseriya and Rizeigat).

• **Peace interlocutors** between community representatives and high-level military leaderships such as the *New Sudan Council of Churches*.

• A church-led ‘People-to-People’ approach instead of isolated ‘reconciliation conferences’. For example, the Dinka-Nuer West Bank ‘Wunlit’ Process involved shuttle diplomacy, exchange visits and preparatory negotiations before any public process took place. Its scope was explicitly sub-national involving national leaders only secondarily. It used context specific styles of storytelling, truth-telling, sacrifice and prayer.

Source: literature review, see p.20 and case study 2 of the report for more
Principle 5: Shared economic interests can create opportunities for peace
But the potential for misuse must be minimised

“The root cause of this peace now [between Lou and Jikany] is all about the shortage of food during this crisis, as they have the border [with Ethiopia] at Wanding. So we decided now to go and have peace with our neighbours... what happens in the future? I don’t know.”
– Koang Thon, former commissioner, Akobo

- Resource-based tensions over grazing land, mineral wealth, or state coffers are a driver of conflict but can also help communities and local elites achieve non-violent strategies that meet mutual economic interest, including better access to pasture, commodities, markets and labour.

- Market rents can be used to help sustain the peace structures. Similarly, peace markets – which bring together communities across conflict lines – are a recurring feature in many areas of South Sudan. Substantial income can develop from trade and taxes. Yet, careful management of income is needed.

- For example, a ‘peace market’ was established at Rubh Nygai, present Greater Unity State, from 1986. The market was a zone of community demilitarisation and all weapons were left at checkpoints some distance from the site.

- Policy and practice implication: Peacebuilders should harness shared economic interest with an emphasis on long-term, locally resourced and locally relevant institution building. The danger for economic initiatives to become income streams for elites and bring negative power accumulation needs to be carefully managed.

Principle 6: Use stories from the past to understand and respond

Historic narrative may be used to connect or divide

“An enemy is someone who you don’t know their history.” – Thor Riek, Trauma healing trainer, USAID/VISTAS Morning Star Programme (paraphrasing Quaker Peace Activist Gene Hoffman)

- Historical narratives connect or divide communities and shape the way people experience the past and the present. They can be important tools for opening and facilitating dialogue. Shared ancestry and periods of past cooperation, can connect communities, strengthen their commitment to peace and help outsiders understand and respect community perceptions in conflict.

- For example, a range of communities from the South Sudan-Uganda-Ethiopia borderlands called the Ateker remember ‘the common great Grandmother’ Nayece each December and reaffirm their ‘Moru-Nayece Peace Accord’. Similarly, in Yirol and Panyijiar, the Dinka and Nuer consider themselves the respective descendants of two sisters ‘Nyatoucha’ and ‘Nyarooba’.

- Similarly, episodes of previous cooperation include military alliances such as between Awlad Omran and Nuer at Rubh Nygai from 1986, trading networks such as between Fellata Chiefs and SPLA commanders in Pariang during the 1980/90s or the mutual hosting of displaced communities such as between southern Nuer and Dinka of Lakes State since the 1960s.

- However, the past can play negatively. The announcement of the creation of 28 states by Establishment Order No.36/2015 AD brought to the surface memories of ‘Kokora’, Nimieri’s June 1983 decree splitting the Southern Region into three. This led to deep divisions in the country, particularly between Equatorian and Dinka communities and elites. According to Bari elders, its narrative resurrection has contributed to the spread of conflict through Equatoria since 2015.
• **Policy and practice implication:** Include historical narratives in conflict analysis and programme design. Integrate collection and analysis of narratives into conflict analysis. Use narratives of conflict and cooperation as tools to facilitate increased understanding.

**Principle 7: Integrate cultural understandings and cultural tools into peacebuilding**  
*But be sure these are context appropriate*

“If an NGO brings bulls for sacrifice, it is like soda, it is just some food to eat, the real sacrifice must be an offering from both sides.” – Dean of Nyang Diocese

• The cultural domain is frequently absent from our conflict analysis, yet it is critical. For example, cattle raiding would make little sense without a basic understanding of the social, political and bride-wealth roles of cows in pastoral societies.

• Cultural practices may be positive, such as valuing hospitality, or negative, such as the treatment of women as property or the celebration of masculinities associated with a revenge culture. This is why the South Sudan Theatre Organization uses Citizen Theatre to create spaces in which young South Sudanese can collectively examine their own cultures.

• NGOs need to acknowledge their limits in understanding the nuance of local culture and do better to bridge the gap. In the case of an inter-clan facilitation by a church leader, the ritual slaughter of a bull and the sharing of meat elevated the agreement to the status of a covenant, binding for all. However, it was weakened by the NGO provision of the sacrificial animals. This was perceived by some to be outside the bounds of their cultural definition of the ritual, which is for the offer to come from both conflicting sides.

• **Policy and practice implication:** Peace actors must understand and hand over power to locally relevant actors in the design, language and symbology of peacebuilding. Critical and reflexive approaches to culture should be encouraged.

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**Defining peace locally and practically**

Interviewees were asked to define ‘peace’, offering very practical indicators. For instance:

• **Peace is freedom of movement:** “People used to move freely but from 1991 they stopped moving. Now they are trying to move, they are trying to have peace.”

• **Peace is trading:** “The absolute main thing is our communities can buy and sell from each other, that does not happen if there if there is no peace.”

• **Peace is a security alliance:** “Peace is existing, they cannot let the government attack through their place.”

• **Peace is maintaining social relations:** “Once peace is made, the two parties can eat at the same place… this means we are in peace.”

• **Peace is shared justice mechanisms:** “[We have peace] because they follow steps in the laws of the culture to return abductees or compensate killing.”

Source: interviews, see p.25 of the report for more
**Principle 8: Invest in local capacities**  
*Including understanding and building on what already exists*

“Problems are like fire, you have to put it off quickly before others come in. If people take a long time to respond it will cause another problem.” – Paramount Chief Malice Marial

- Local actors need capacity to respond to local issues as they arise, not just to implement a set of pre-determined activities provided under a grant. Local capacity and infrastructure for peace need to be able to respond to incidents and mitigate cases of high risk of escalation.

- For example, the Governor of Lakes State formed a Special Court to be headed by a Paramount Chief Malice Marial, a respected peacebuilder who had worked as far afield as Aweil and Bor. Special Courts have become a preferred method when the legal process can take a long time and quick resolution is required, as with the nationwide judicial strike that crippled the formal court system in June 2017.

- Some argue, such as CBO STEWARD Women Director Josephine Chandiru in Eastern Equatoria, how difficult it is to access long-term core or adaptive, flexible funding to provide this type of locally relevant peacebuilding: “with the exception of PAX, we have three-months projects, five-months projects, we even have one-month projects… a one-month project and you want results? You won’t see any.”

- Some donors, such as the EU, are allowing funds to be used flexibly and some donor policies already outline the importance of adaptation and flexibility, as noted by Odd Evjen from the Norwegian Church Aid. Yet, this still depends on the understanding of donor teams. Moreover, this flexibility is not necessarily reaching local organisations.

**Policy and practice implication:** Donors and peacebuilders should ensure that peacebuilding strategies and programmes prioritise the strengthening of local institutions and capacities, situated close to conflict. Local awareness, capacity, and resilience can strengthen ability to make the choice to opt out of conflict and mobilisation.

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**Principle 9: Peacebuilding is nothing without communication**  
*Communication is both objective and method*

“We shared experiences directly from people in the Protection of Civilian (PoC) site on the town radio, it helped change everything.” – Inter Church Committee, Bentiu Town

- Awareness-raising can help prevent agreements from derailing, build trust, and transform relationships. Rumours during a conflict can cause violence. Peace conferences, exchange visits, written communications, mobile phones, the distribution of SD cards, radio and mobile cinema can help strengthen a peace process and manage expectations. Audio, photo and video recordings are particularly powerful for communities to see who is backing up an agreement. Strengthening communications may be a primary entry point to help build grassroots movements for peace.

- The challenges are enormous. In many areas, particularly those under opposition control, there is no operational mobile network, which impacts heavily on conflict management. As Bul Dieu, Vice President of Tergoli Town Council in the Jonglei border, explains, “the thing that has made everything worse is the lack of network, everything is falling apart, Lou and Murle have Thuraya Satellite phone to talk, we have an old telegram machine!” Many populations live dispersed or are mobile for certain periods of the year, and transportation may be impossible in the rainy season.

**Policy and practice implication:** Contextually appropriate communication techniques should be an integrated component of peacebuilding strategies.
Principle 10: It’s not what you do, it’s how you do it – integrity is key

Soft skills and commitment are as valuable as technical expertise

“A peacebuilder in our culture is one who tells the truth and is honest, who commits him or herself to what she is doing.” – Marion Akon, Leader, Akobo Women’s Association

- Peacebuilders require a full range of skills. Alongside concrete skills and technical knowledge, peacebuilders stress the importance of other qualities that help an individual build relationships, trust and contribute to facilitating dialogue – for example listening; the ability to not place ourselves at the centre of a narrative but to understand our own role; the value of humility, generosity, and commitment. Too often these are undervalued as ‘soft skills’, but they can be more important to the success of an initiative or process than ‘technical skills’.

- In particular, honesty and integrity are needed in peacebuilding, enabling one to ensure that one’s contribution is realistic, relevant to context, and responsive to conflict analysis while also building trust, managing expectations, shared learning, and enabling collective strengths.

- For example, the Abyei case study illustrates how Reverend Stephen Mou spent a long time sitting with and listening with Dinka Ngok in Abyei Town and Misseriya in Diffra during a conflict analysis, opening an opportunity for a slow peace process to begin.

- Organisational culture and programme implementation should mitigate against the risk of ‘spoiling’ genuine peace. NGOs should reflect on how their own activities, institutional practice, money and presence can affect or change peace processes and community expectations, including skewing markets.

- Policy and practice implication: Donors and NGOs should invest in peacebuilding skills such as listening and intercultural communication, e.g. language skills. They should reward skills such as commitment and honesty and invest in staff time to build relationships with and learning from local actors. Donors and NGOs should ensure that they understand their own role and effect on local peace processes.
3. Conclusion

‘Local’ does not mean unimportant, nor does it preclude important roles for high level actors. Sub-national conflict can impact national dynamics of peace and war, not least because national leaders depend upon local constituencies to supply fighting forces and for legitimacy. Although the interaction between levels is frequently opaque to international observers – such as through delivery of money, grain or suits to local leaders – alliances and networks for peace can establish shared institutions that provide security for communities in the absence of high-level agreements.

The design of high-level peace processes can have negative effects locally when not aligned with the realities of multi-level conflict in South Sudan, or if edicts simply do not work for many communities across the country. In this context, sub-national peace work is valuable in at least five ways, which together may help challenge the very logic of power in the country and create the conditions in which a nationwide political transformation becomes possible:

1. It can help mitigate the divisive effects of the dominant mode of elite competition and prevent escalation of security incidents and grievance;
2. It can improve lives in the short term and build relationships which reduce opportunities for violence in the future;
3. It may help forge a positive accountability between communities and leaders and help connect South Sudan’s disparate communities with one another;
4. It can help reduce military options and promote economic benefits of peace to all;
5. It can help inform national level processes with customary and cultural values and practices, so that such initiatives also reflect, for example, truth-telling, cultural ritual and performance and public dissemination into their design. This could add meaning to both high-level participants and the wider population.

Therefore, donors and practitioners should invest in overarching, multi-level strategies to guide engagement in sub-national peace processes. Strategic approaches to high-level peace processes should look beyond ‘who is around the table’ and engage with a broader strategy which prioritises understanding and addressing root causes of conflict.

A road to peace will require multiple initiatives covering political, economic, social, cultural and psychological needs, but there is an urgent need for every peace actor to ask whether their contribution reflects South Sudan’s interlocking, multi-level conflicts, and whether it makes sense when viewed from different centres within South Sudan. This kind of thinking is currently lacking. To do this, peace actors must engage in meaningful multi-level conflict analysis, be creative in appraising how to work with or complement diverse approaches and existing initiatives (including being willing to hand over power to local agency and capacity when possible) and develop effective ways of sharing their lessons and conclusions. We must also confront some difficult practical and ethical dilemmas with honesty and integrity to ensure peacebuilding is not only conflict sensitive but contributes to long-term peace and stability. Ultimately, only South Sudanese can resolve their own issues, therefore peace initiatives and problem solving must belong to them. Peace actors working from the grassroots to the highest level must take this on board and understand their own role as facilitators.

It is a daunting task, but peace is being made every day in the towns, villages and cattle camps across South Sudan, offering many entry points. Donors and peacebuilders have achieved much in South Sudan, but there is a need to modify our approach and change some of the ways we talk about peacebuilding. A good place to start would be greater emphasis on supporting multi-level, inclusive and long-term peace strategies designed in ways that can engage all South Sudanese.
Methodology – how we researched

This research reviewed existing literature and conducted interviews with over 50 long-term peacebuilding practitioners on their everyday experiences of peacebuilding in South Sudan. Throughout 2017, in-depth interviews were conducted in Lakes State, Akobo County, and Juba, as well as with many community members affected by, involved with or guiding their work. The findings also draw on the experiences of the author with high-level and grassroots peacebuilding efforts across the country since 2006. The interview methodology was heavily influenced by two complementary frameworks: 1) The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) guidelines on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding; and 2) the McKinsey 7 business management model. The latter was integrated because of its strong emphasis on ‘softer’ elements such as values, style, staff and skills, largely missing from the DAC guidelines.

Limitations: Despite aiming to illuminate peacebuilding taking place in everyday communities, for practical reasons many of the interviews still relate to work with some local or international NGO involvement. Sources for case studies are also more related to design and implementation work than to evaluations of peacebuilding initiatives, which were beyond the scope of this study. Much more work is required to understand how complex multi-level power dynamics are negotiated in practice. Nevertheless, the findings do reflect learning from a diverse range of peacebuilders with decades of experience.
Acknowledgments – the team behind

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View full report here: caid.org.uk/south-sudan-report