

Executive Summary



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Christian Aid (CA) **conducted this learning review** to understand how **Participatory, Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments (PVCAs)** have helped communities pull funding, resources and services from actors such as the state, private sector, donors and NGOs in the context of the Programme Partnership Arrangement (PPA) programme.

We **identified 80 cases** in which communities **secured resources for themselves** and aimed to understand how this happened. This total of

cases is likely to be conservative as we know of other cases not captured by the reports – thus we could not verify, describe them in detail and account for them.

Leverage mostly happened in the areas of **protection (25 cases), water (20), livelihoods (17)** but also in education, health, gender, community organising and transport. 20 of the cases had an explicit mixed thematic approach, mostly linking protection and another theme. The **Occupied Palestinian Territories (oPt) was the country programme with the highest number of reported cases (31)**, followed by Kenya (28), Bolivia (13), the DRC, the Philippines, Honduras and Iraq (less than 5 each). **12 partners** were reported to have been involved across the 80 cases – with a few cases including more than one partner. There is an **increasing trend in reporting leverage cases**, with the oPt being the pioneer in 2013. **50 out of 80 cases were secured from public actors**, mostly regional and county governments, while the most prominent non-state actors providing resources were other NGOs. **18 cases were assigned a financial value**, ranging from 325,000 euros leveraged from ECHO [European Humanitarian Aid] in Bolivia to the 96,000 Kenyan Shillings raised from within the community by a community group in Kenya. A total of **1,273,389 GBP was raised** by communities themselves for the cases that reported financial amounts between 2013-2016.

The causes of successful leverage reported comprised the **quality of PVCAs**, including additional features such as the existence of advocacy plans and the alignment of PVCA demands with governmental processes. Other factors include the **brokering capacity of partners and community leaders** and **previous community's organising strength**. Likewise, **other country factors** may enable more leveraging of resources – these include the existence of numerous NGOs willing to support development actions as in the oPt; likeminded participatory NGOs as in Afghanistan; or a relatively open government as in Kenya. Finally, PVCAs were said to be **hard to apply with certain groups** such as nomads, people living with the presence of urban gangs and people living in emergency and conflict contexts as in Northern Kenya, Honduras, Bangladesh, DRC and Iraq. Despite the challenges, leverage cases were also reported in these countries.

Recommendations include: **(1) Develop a 'leverage approach' to PVCAs**. This could involve strengthening current stakeholder power mapping to identify options for pulling resources and inviting state and other actors such as the private sector and the media to shadow the PVCA process. Specific emphasis should go to better linking PVCAs to governmental schemes including information

about leverage and decentralisation openings to communities early in the PVCAs. Partner budgets can also be adapted to the leverage capacity in each country. **(2) Improve the reporting and storing of leverage data.** This could involve a question in the annual reporting process asking for a description of leverage cases, including *what was secured, when, where and how; who the resources were secured from and who benefited from this leverage;* and, finally *the reasons that contributed to the leverage.* Better reporting and storing on PVCA progress and leverage should also be supported at country and community level, as well as cross-programmatic learning at the international level.

The review is intended for the learning and strategy of CA and partners and may also be used to provide evidence to donors on the added value that PVCAs have brought through leveraging of own resources and services and long-term development in communities. The study was a collaborative effort between Programmes staff and the Research hub at CA and was led by Nina Watson and Kas Sempere. It drew on a review of PVCA-related reports as well as partner interviews and feedback from PVCA experts. Our thanks to all those who collaborated in this review. For a **quick read of the document**, you may want to directly **jump to sections 5 and 6 (pages 15-18).**

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Table of Acronyms

- CA – Christian Aid
- ECHO – European Commission Humanitarian Aid
- oPt – Occupied Palestinian Territories
- PARC – Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (partner, oPt)
- PMSD – Participatory Market Systems Development
- PPA – Programme Partnership Arrangement supported by DFID
- PVCA – Participatory, Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment (participatory methodology)
- YMCA – Young Men’s Christian Association (partner, oPt)

1. Background

A *Participatory, Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment* or PVCA is a process carried out in a community to collect and analyse perceived risks and threats, the vulnerabilities underlying these risks, and the community's own resources to address them. *Action plans* follow based on this analysis. The assessment builds a community's understanding about the risks they face and how they are connected to each other, and linked to systems and processes that make and keep people poor and vulnerable. Action plans are essentially a community's own risk management plan. PVCAs are facilitated by partners and, sometimes, by CA staff (Christian Aid, 2016: p.14)¹.

Ideally, PVCAs strengthen the ability of a community to anticipate, organise for and adapt to change. If done well, PVCA community-led design and implementation supports people to analyse their problems and suggest their own solutions, and can have an empowering effect on people's capacity for collective action (Christian Aid, 2009)². Moreover, PVCAs are an important source of information for CA partners and communities to design high quality projects and prepare advocacy plans that address identified risks and vulnerabilities.

PVCAs were introduced in CA in 2011 as part of the DFID funded *Programme Partnership Arrangement* (PPA). PVCAs were initially used for humanitarian programming, which namely dealt with disaster risk reduction work in rural, urban and conflict settings. Several reviews had recommended to apply PVCAs to livelihood, development and poverty eradication work as well (Christian Aid, 2016: p.2). PVCAs then started to be used for longer term development work on livelihoods, markets and climate change adaptation, mostly in rural areas. The PPA health programmes did not use PVCAs. Since 2013, a CA programme called BRACED has adapted PVCAs to emphasise weather analysis, what is known as 'BRAPAS'. This review focuses on PVCAs that took place under the PPA only.

The use PVCAs in the PPA spanned 17 PPA countries in Africa (5), Asia (5), Latin America (5) and the Middle East (2). PPA countries comprise Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, DRC, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Nicaragua, oPt, Peru, the Philippines, South Asia (sic), and Zimbabwe. Most of these country programmes were in the PPA since 2011 until 2016, with some exceptions³. As an estimation given in a meeting with CA staff experts in PVCAs, each country programme did PVCAs with an average of 12 communities during that 5-year period.

In 2016, a PPA review suggested that some communities are using their PVCA action plans as a written, negotiating tool with local authorities (Christian Aid: 2016, p.2,17). Yet, the review also notes that most programmes have used PVCAs as a planning and reflection tool rather than as a process for planning, monitoring and learning about changing power relations (ibid: p.3,12). There also seems to be country variation in the capacity of partners to adopt PVCAs depending on past participatory experience, as well as in the ways of using them –technical versus empowering (ibid: p.12-3, 17). Finally, the review mentioned that work tends to be based on 'the community', including no clear gender analysis (ibid, p.17-8). However, a few cases exist of exploring how risks affect specific groups – for instance, fishing communities as an economic sector in the oPt and Dalits in India, as noted during feedback to this review.

The review drew data on three methods: a review of PVCA-related reports in the 19 countries that implemented PVCAs from 2011-16 in the PPA programme; an in-depth case study of PVCAs in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (oPt) with interviews to CA's oPt coordinator, and partners PARC and YMCA; and meetings and feedback from PVCA-expert staff.

2. Research questions

There are two research questions, exploring the ‘what’ (descriptive) and the ‘why’ (explanatory) of leveraging resources and services in the PVCAs:

- 1) What **successful examples** exist of **communities leveraging resources and services from other actors**, outside of the PPA funding, in the PPA PVCAs from 2011 – 2016?
- 2) Which **factors** made these examples of leveraging resources successful?

With regards to the first descriptive question:

- **‘Community leverage’** is the capacity of communities to raise new resources and services from actors other than DFID because of DFID’s contribution through CA. Previous internal work on the notion of ‘leverage’ included *income* and *influence leverage* (Chowns, 2013)⁴. As agreed in preparatory meetings with PVCA-expert staff, this review only takes the first meaning, ‘income leverage’ and broadens it to include *in-kind resources* and *services*. We also considered PVCA replications and adaptations as leverage when they were driven by other actors other than CA.
- **‘Resources’** leveraged may refer to money but also physical goods or in-kind contributions.
- **‘Services’** refer to non-tangible resources such as education and health, which can be provided privately or publicly. This includes protection services as suggested by CA staff experts in PVCAs.
- **‘Successful examples’** denote any PVCA process which resulted in leverage of resources and services. We only include advocacy or change in power relations (e.g. opportunities, access and control by vulnerable groups) when they had served to raise leverage.
- **‘Other actors’** include bodies from whom communities have leveraged resources and services aside from DFID’s original funding. These include a community leveraging resources: itself, i.e. self-funding initiatives, or from other communities; from CA or partners, as well as from other NGOs, excluding CA and partners; from governmental authorities, individuals and bodies at the local, regional and national levels; from donor countries (donor agencies, embassies) and para-state institutions (e.g. UN); and from the private sector and the media.

With regards to the second analytical question, **‘factors’** include individuals, groups and processes cited as essential in leveraging resources and services. These may comprise:

- **Micro-contextual factors** or observable causes (who led the process, the length of time of relationships between actors, the stage at which leverage efforts began, existence of a facilitator linking short-term and long-term strategies of resource mobilisation, working with new/known, active/less active communities, community power dynamics, quality of the relationship between actors, especially between partner and community).
- **Macro-contextual factors** or less observable causes such as the political environment, governmental structures, geography, e.g. urban/rural, accountability, cultural norms, etc.

Some initial hypotheses responding to the second question were suggested by PVCA-expert staff, e.g. on power relationships⁵. Unfortunately, the nature of the data used in this review was not strong enough to explore power.

3. Methodology

This review consists of a desk-based study on **previous PVCA documents**, three **interviews** to CA and partner staff in the oPt and **feedback from PVCA-expert staff** in CA through meetings and emails. The oPt was selected because it presented more leverage cases than any other country programme (and the most detailed ones) after completing the desk-based study. The desk-based study responds to both research questions while the oPt case interviews were used to cross-check leverage examples found and further explore their causes for leverage.

3.1. Desk-based study. The first task was to collect and organise PVCA documents together in a database. Reports were provided by the PVCA-expert staff and some by CA country staff, e.g. DRC, oPt. Documents comprised *PVCA-specific reports* such as original Action Plans, PVCA reports, PVCA country summaries of reports, PVCA trainings; and *PVCA-related reports* with mentions or sections on PVCAs but not fully focused on PVCA, such as impact assessments, outcome assessments, PPA reports and country case studies⁶. A thorough reading of reports was made and leverage data summarised in a format of closed options to enable aggregation and comparison (see Table 1). Questions 1 to 6 relate to research question 1 while Question 7 of ‘factors’ relates to research question 2.

Table 1: Example of leverage case in the secondary data analysis database

Standard categories	Example
Example of leverage (community name)	Building water networks (Ammuriya)
Theme	Water
Description	Support in building water networks...
Q1: Year (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, unknown)	2016
Q2: Country	oPt
Q3: Partner	PARC
Q4: Type of leverage (money, in-kind, services, others)	Public service
Q5: Amount leveraged (if given)	No data available
Q6: Actors involved (e.g. local government)	Palestinian Water Authority
Q7: Contributing factors mentioned (open question)	No data available

Source: own elaboration

3.2. Partner interviews (oPt). The second task was to interview informants. A total of three interviews were made – to CA’s staff coordinator in charge of the oPt (who in turn supported us in getting more partner contacts), and to representatives of the two CA partners in the oPt, PARC and YMCA. Interviews were conducted via Skype except for the interview with CA staff coordinator that took place in the offices of London. Interviews were recorded and summarised in detail but not transcribed. The format of interviews was based on the list of leverage examples extracted from secondary data for each partner. We shared those with the interviewees and asked them to give us more details on the cases they were familiar with, particularly on reasons why leverage happened. We also left it open for them to add more leverage cases during the interview.

3.3. PVCA-expert staff meetings and feedback. We also had the support of staff acquainted with PVCAs in CA, including David Adam, Gerhard Buttner, Alicia Malouf, Honorine Nyolo Tabu, Rebecca Sinclair and Simone di Vicenz. They inputted their knowledge along the review process, from the suggestion of questions to be explored to the provision of documentation and revision of findings.

3.4. Since the review was desk based, there were **few ethical concerns or risks to respondents**. Names of informants have been anonymised yet there is a high risk of informant recognition as interviewees and PVCA-staff experts were few. The review aimed to consider gender and other axes of discrimination, but could not go into detail to explore this due to lack of data.

Several **challenges in report analysis** were however found:

- We had reports for all PPA countries doing PVCAs. Reports for 2012 were scarce.
- There does not seem to be a systematic gathering of PVCA data, e.g. no country PVCA summary reports gathered yearly on action plan results. If they exist, they do not reach CA's intranet. For the oPt case, feedback to this review noted that this happened through updated action plans. These were discussed in bi-weekly/monthly meetings with partners and were saved as meeting minutes on the intranet. Some evaluation reports also note the one-off nature of many PVCAs. This made it hard to find leverage impact in reports as they mostly contained 'planning' data. Thus, for many examples we only had hints on what could have been leveraged.
- The reports we worked with were written for other purposes and not necessarily for understanding leverage. Thus, leverage data was not always present. When we did find leverage data, cases were not always fully described. As a PVCA-expert staff member put it, the linkages are often not shown in reporting – who did what, where and why.
- Attribution of leverage was difficult in reports that were not PVCA-specific, e.g. joint outcome assessments on the PPA and the CHASE (humanitarian) programmes, unless a specific statement was made.

This led us to include several interviews in the oPt as primary data. Some PVCA expert staff suggested that we draw on interviews only. Yet, this would have made an overall, comparative picture with detailed data more difficult. We would have probably leaned on the informants' memories too much. We deemed that a mixture of secondary and primary sources was the best option – listing the leverage cases found in reports and bringing them back to the memory of interviewees for further details.

Only detailed and attributed leverage cases were included. Examples were excluded when: (a) they did not have enough information, e.g. the actors were not stated; (b) the example was well described but did not state whether this happened because of a PVCA. Instead, we read leverage when the action had been undertaken or, at most, funds had been formally committed, e.g. in the public budget. Advocacy efforts that did not have a clear written engagement were excluded. Finally, while most of the cases reported referred to single villages, there were also some cases that referred to several villages or a wider area. Since the data was associated to that broader unit of analysis in these cases and we could not break data down, we counted these as single examples (e.g. cases 21, 37, 38, 69 in our database of leverage cases, available on request).

In conclusion, the list presented is illustrative of the best reported cases and not representative of all possible leverage cases. Given all the reporting challenges exposed, we could suspect that **the total of reported leverage cases is an underestimation.**

4. Findings

This section presents an **aggregate profile of leverage cases** (section 4.1), and both **local and country factors influencing leverage cases** (sections 4.2 and 4.3). This is done for all countries, with focus on the oPt as the case study.

Table 2: Leverage cases per theme

Protection	25
Water	20
Livelihoods	17
Education	7
Health	4
Gender	4
Community organising	2
Transport	1

Source: own elaboration

4.1. Profile of leverage cases

This section describes the leverage cases, including the themes, countries, partners and year of the cases, type of resource leveraged and amount of reported money leveraged, if any.

4.1.1. Total of leverage cases and themes. A total of **80 leverage examples⁷** were identified **mostly in the areas of protection, water, livelihoods** (categorised as covering land, fisheries, livestock, industry and markets) and to a minor extent in education, health, gender, community organising and transport (see Table 2). The relevance of protection and risk management

is partly logical since CA primarily invested funds in supporting disaster risk reduction and livelihoods for PPA PVCAs. Water stands as the second most leveraged theme.

25% of the cases had a mixed thematic approach (20 out of 80), with 17 involving protection *and* another theme such as livelihoods, water, gender, education and housing. The other 3 mixed cases integrated livelihoods *and* gender and water issues. Cases included land exploitation for territorial protection in the oPt; seeds/damns against droughts in Kenya; forest fire breaks for cacao production in Bolivia; witness testifying on sexual violence by military personnel in the DRC; and a safe school bus and rehabilitation work for safer houses in the oPt (see Box 1). These cases illustrate how **initial funding on disaster risk reduction and livelihoods turned into leverage cases that integrated other social areas**. In a way, these examples demonstrate that it is possible to bring together both natural and conflict hazards as well as social risks in the idea of ‘risk’ (oPt picture power report, 2015).

Box 1: Mixed thematic leverage (protection and livelihoods) – home gardens against land confiscation in Al-Raween, oPt

“Using the community action plan, the YMCA worked with the community and PVCA volunteers to secure funding for 34 home gardens to be implemented, funded by the Dan Church Aid (DCA). The PVCA volunteers and community organisation were involved in deciding the location of these gardens. YMCA engineers implemented an irrigation system, and seeds and fertilisers were also given by DCA. The communities expect to reap financial benefits from this intervention. Because the gardens are located next to houses, it also makes accessing them safe in an environment where accessing your land is dangerous due to attacks from Israeli settlers/Israeli military patrol exercises. They also mitigate the building restrictions on the village – the community cannot build to expand or enhance their livelihoods because they’re based in Area C and any building / improvements to buildings are subject to demolition by the Israeli Army. Planting gardens is a way of utilising the land in a productive way that is not at risk of destruction. The value of this leveraged funding is \$30,000”.

An interviewee added that: *“In Rawaeen, people have the need for income generating projects, for food security, and for income... Gardens address several risks: food security, employment, and keeping land from confiscation. Another factor that has made this project so successful is that the members have been able to use this example to convince other organizations that farming in the desert is a possible and worthwhile endeavour. In succeeding in making their corner of the desert green, the villagers of Rawaeen demonstrate the success that results from their attitude of tenacity and hope”.*

Source: reports oPt, CHSJ Logframe 2013, Theory of Change for Resilient Livelihoods, 2015; interview YMCA partner

Table 3: Leverage cases per country

oPt	31
Kenya	28
Bolivia	13
DRC	4
Philippines	2
Honduras	1
Iraq	1

Source: own elaboration

4.1.2. Countries and partners. The countries with most reported leverage cases were the oPt, Kenya and Bolivia, followed by the DRC, Philippines, Honduras, and Iraq (see Table 3). There was a **total of 12 partners** involved in supporting leveraging (see Table 4). The partner that reported to have been involved in more leverage cases is YMCA in the oPt. This is without counting cases coordinated by several partners. Only a few cases include several partners. Kenya is the country with more reported partners involved in leveraging – 3 partners (see Table 4).

Table 4: Partners involved in supporting leverage

Name of partner	Country	Cases by one partner	Cases by more than one partner
YMCA	oPt	17	2 joint cases with PARC
PARC	oPt	12	
PACIDA	Kenya	9	1 joint case with ADSMKE
Soluciones Practicas (SP)	Bolivia	6	2 joint cases with CIPCA
CBCA	DRC	4	
ADSE	Kenya	3	
ADSMKE	Kenya	3	
CIPCA	Bolivia	2	
PhilNet	Philippines	1	
UCHOA	Philippines	1	
CASM	Honduras	1	
REACH	Iraq	1	

Source: own elaboration; 12 cases in Kenya and 3 cases in Bolivia do not state the partner

The final number of leverage cases does not necessarily imply that unmentioned countries or partners lacked leverage cases. This is because we were only able to count the cases reported and, within these, the cases reported with enough detail. For instance, we know by word-of-mouth that the DRC and the oPt had more cases but we did not find them in reports so could not verify and describe their basic details. Likewise, the Philippines reported leverage cases but few were explicitly attributed to PVCA so we could not count them in either. Only the reports from Bolivia, Kenya and the oPt assessed PVCA leverage more systematically, which logically brought a higher number of cases for these countries. Also, interviews were limited to the oPt because of time. Yet, it was in any case difficult to gather detailed data on leverage cases from interviews because of the difficulty for respondents to remember the details from the cases. In short, findings must be read within these limitations even when our analysis was exhaustive of all reports made available to us for all countries⁸.

4.1.3. Evolution of reported leverage. 12 of the 80 cases were reported in 2013, all from the oPt. By 2015, 23 more cases had been reported from Bolivia, DRC, Honduras, Iraq, oPt and Kenya. In 2016, 45 new cases were reported from Bolivia, DRC, oPt, Kenya, and the Philippines, with twice the cases in 2016 as compared to 2015. For the reports studied, this means that there is an **increasing trend in reporting leverage cases**. This may partly indicate that **the longer the projects were conducted, the more opportunity there was for leverage**. Also, **more PVCAs were conducted from 2014 onwards**, which could be another contributing factor for this increase, as noted during feedback to this review.

The **oPt pioneered the reporting of cases in 2013** while other countries started to report leverage from 2015 onwards. Most of these cases corresponded to Bolivia and Kenya – Bolivia reported 5 cases

in 2015 and 8 cases in 2016 while Kenya reported 4 cases in 2015 and 24 cases in 2016. Feedback to the review suggests that this **may be due to the budget available to partners**. In the oPt, the budget per partner was quite small as CA considered that there was other external funding to draw on. Partners were not generally used to looking for leveraging funds. But once the message passed that they could use the action plans to do so, they eventually did. As leverage moved in the opposite direction to visibility of individual projects, it required a mind shift. In places like Afghanistan, partners had bigger funds available per community and did not look for leverage until the last year of PPA.

Another reviewer notes that there was an **evolution towards factoring leverage in the PVCAs**. That is, the first action plans produced were not specific as to who would do what, for instance, between communities and branches of Government. Then, there was a realisation that the action plans needed to be more specific and so stakeholder and power mapping with partners and communities was carried out to identify who, why and when, thus better enabling future leveraging.

The oPt showed a slight decreasing trend, reporting 12 cases in 2013, 11 in 2015 and 8 in 2016. A reason for this may be that leverage **cases started to be reported earlier and we did not count them again** if they were cited in later reports. Feedback to this review added that **partners, especially YMCA, had to spend PPA money on action plan activities in the final period of the PPA programme, thus not needing to leverage money** – partners had in fact underspent due to the amount of funds leveraged from elsewhere. **Equally, PARC and YMCA had exited two communities each** as they deemed these communities were already able to leverage financial support by themselves (ibid).

4.1.4. Types of resources leveraged. We divided the ‘type of resources leveraged’ in public and non-public funds and services. **50 out of 80 cases were leveraged from public actors**, with or without other non-public leveraging⁹. Kenya led the leveraging of governmental funds as compared to the oPt (24 of 28 cases in Kenya were public leverage versus 11 of 31 in the oPt). Half of public leverage cases were provided by regional and county governments (26) followed by national authorities such as Ministries, Vice-Ministries and national bodies and funds (15), and local authorities/municipalities (9). Leverage collaborations with non-state actors were more common in national/regional bodies than in local ones (9 and 2 cases). No leverage collaborations were reported between governments and the private sector, or between national/regional and local governments.

17 out of 30 cases leveraged from non-state actors were provided by other NGOs (see Box 2 for two examples)¹⁰. To a minor extent, resources were also raised from the private sector¹¹, own communities, para-state agencies/donor states¹², CA/CA partners¹³ and the media (between 1 and 5 cases each). There were no leverage cases reported from academia or faith organisations.

The case leveraged from the media regards a freelance film-maker who recorded a documentary for a community. A few cases also mention media bodies supporting communities for advocacy and leverage on other actors. For instance, in Ammuriya (oPt), members of the community were ignored by local authorities on water demands but an interview on the national TV station after the communities’ request for support to the broadcasters made the authorities change their mind.

Box 2: Example of non-public leverage

From other NGOs: *“As a result of the success of the PVCA approach in the communities PARC is working in, they have introduced the process to Save the Children in oPt which is now implementing an expansive programme in 12 communities in the West Bank with the PVCA approach. PARC is now considered an expert in PVCAs and DRR, particularly in agricultural communities. Many other NGOs in Palestine are asking PARC for advice on community representation, such as within the shelter cluster”*

From the private sector: “Market research and advocacy work in Beit Skariya [oPt] with the community molasses factory has brought about links with various companies and private sector bodies. One example is the funding leveraged from Royal Industrial Trading Co. worth \$2,000 for factory equipment plus entrance to the National Food Exhibition in 2015 (each ticket is \$1,800) and pro bono advice as a result of the support provided by the YMCA Market Specialist”.

Source: Theory of Change for Middle East Resilient Livelihoods PPA, 2014-15

4.1.5. Amount of reported money leveraged. A total of **18 cases** were assigned a financial value. 10 of these involved state actors (see Table 5) while 8 were fully non-public (see Table 6). Some amounts were estimated by the respective report authors to symbolise the money that a service would have cost to undertake or the cost of the resources leveraged (reported as ‘estimated’, ‘worth it’, ‘valued at approximately’). Other cases were real values (reported as ‘costing’, ‘to the value of’, ‘secured’).

Aggregating the 18 cases, the **total amount of leverage raised between 2013-16 was of 1,273,389 GBP** (with all currencies converted into GBP at historical rates and inflation adjusted for 2016 as the base year)¹⁴. The figure must be read with caution: (1) this review presents a partial picture of leverage in CA’s global programmes portfolio as it only relies on PPA documentation; (2) comparison is limited because of multiple contexts, with diverse countries and programmatic scales, e.g. ECHO funded project versus a self-funding community initiative. Some amounts are also estimates, not real figures. Finally, individuals and communities may value resources differently to the monetary dimension.

Table 5: Leverage cases involving state actors

Leverage case from/involving state actors	Country, Partner and Year	Amount leveraged	Actor leveraged from
Scaling Up the PPA funded PVCA project through working in Consortium (12 communities in the departments of La Paz and Beni)	Bolivia, Soluciones Practicas, 2015	325,000 EUROS [239,502 GBP in 2015] Real (the total project budget was 2 million euros ¹⁵)	ECHO funds [EU]; Consortium of Government, FAO, UNICEF, International Organisation of Migrations, Ayuda en Acción, UNDP, CA and Soluciones Practicas
Purchase of lots and/or construction of evacuation centers (Magdiwang, Romblon/Sibuyan Island)	Philippines, PhilNet, 2016	2.832 million Php [46,353 GBP in 2016] Real	Local Government unit
Construction of Nomadic primary schools (Turbi and Funan Qumbi communities)	Kenya, PACIDA, 2016	6.2 million K. shillings [48,247 GBP in 2016] Real	County Government of Marsabit; Constituency Development Fund
Construction of Health Centre’s maternity wing, staff quarters and latrines (Turbi)	Kenya, PACIDA, 2016	6 million K. shillings [46,691 GBP in 2016] Real	County Government of Marsabit; GOAL
Construction of underground water Storage tank (Funan Qumbi Community)	Kenya, PACIDA, 2016	30 million K. shillings [233,457 GBP in 2016] Estimated	County Government of Marsabit
Construction of underground water tank and Masonry Tank (Toricha and Ngororoi, pastoralists communities)	Kenya, ADSMKE, 2016	4.2 million K. shillings [32,684 GBP in 2016] Real	Members of Parliament; County Level Government
Construction and equipping of Dispensary (Ellebor and Toricha)	Kenya, ADSMKE, 2016	5 million K. shillings [38,909 GBP in 2016] Real	County Government

Water system to provide drinking water (Rurrenabaque)	Bolivia, Soluciones Practicas, 2016	6,484 GBP Real	Municipality of Rurrenabaque
Water system projects to provide drinking water in forest indigenous communities (Villa Fatima and Villa Alcira communities)	Bolivia, ?, 2016	94,484 GBP Real	Municipality of San Buenaventura
Crocodile management plan for sustainable hunting and commercialisation of the meat and skin (unknown)	Bolivia, ?, 2016	7,086 GBP Real	Municipality of ?

Source: own elaboration; rates for exchange taken on the 31/12 of the stated year on www.oanda.com

Table 6: Leverage cases not involving state actors

Leverage case / non-state actors	Country and partner	Amount leveraged Real / Estimated	Actor leveraged
Land reclamation and rehabilitation project (several)	oPt, YMCA, 2013	USD 164,000 [99,447 GBP in 2013] Real	NGO Development Center; French Consulate in Jerusalem
Secure funding for 34 home gardens (unknown)	oPt, YMCA, 2013	USD 30,000 [18,191 GBP in 2013] Estimated	Dan Church Aid
Rehabilitation of tents and animal shelters (Al Rashayda)	oPt, YMCA, 2013	EUR 8,000 [6,678 GBP in 2013] Estimated	Fonds Social de Développement (FSD)
Community molasses factory (Beit Skariya)	oPt, YMCA, 2015	USD 3,800 [2,563 GBP in 2015] Estimated	Royal Industrial Trading Co
Concrete foundation against scorpions and snakes (Al Rashayda)	oPt, YMCA, 2015	EUR 7,800 [5,748 GBP in 2015] Estimated	French Consulate in Jerusalem
VSL kitty from community (1 village)	Kenya, ADSE, 2015	96,000 K. shillings [621 GBP in 2015] Real	Own community
Construction of modern Livestock market (Turbi)	Kenya, PACIDA, 2016	43 million K. shillings [334,622 GBP in 2016] Real	ACDI-VOCA
Communal shelter 'Arca de Yumani' (community of Puerto Yumani, municipality of Rurrenabaque, Beni department)	Bolivia, Soluciones Practicas/CIPCA, 2016	886 GBP Real	Private wood company, CA

Source: own elaboration; rates for exchange taken on the 31/12 of the stated year on www.oanda.com

4.2. Micro factors influencing leverage cases

The past section gave a description of leverage cases. This section looks at the factors that were cited to have helped leverage, either in the reports or in the interviews. 47 out of the 80 cases found in the reports came with one or more reasons suggested for the success of the leverage cases, which we have categorised as per Table 7.

4.2.1. The most cited reason in reports to have been able to achieve leverage relates to **having undertaken a PVCA process and their action plans**. As women in the village of Nahla [oPt] said: *“the action plan is our map”* (Theory of Change for Middle East Resilient Livelihoods PPA, 2014-15) upon which the community rely as a negotiating, written document to garner support from other actors. Positive aspects noted are that PVCAs help communities understand the risks and their resources/capacities to address such risks (interview; Humanitarian PPA Annual Review, Honduras, 2015).

Table 7: Reasons for successful leverage (in reports)	
PVCA risk assessment/plans (mentioned explicitly)	27
Brokering role of partners	16
Brokering role of community representatives	11
Community commitment/experience/organising	6
Advocacy plan/training/tools (e.g. petition)	6
Alignment with governmental processes	5
Role of media	3
Brokering role of CA	2
Others (only 1 mention each)	9

Source: own elaboration

While citing PVCAs as a leveraging factor may seem logical, there are cases where other accompanying factors were deemed as influential as PVCAs themselves, e.g. the brokering capacity of a partner. Yet, this may simply mean that the reporter did not catch the relationship when the community may have considered it important. Also, PVCA is a collection of different PRA tools; thus, the ‘PVCAs’ might not be named as such locally. Finally, this review was conducted in

retrospect, which means that the question was not asked directly. The 80 cases reported were in any case linked to PVCAs – i.e. all the examples were found in a PVCA report or section even if PVCAs were not cited in the given case.

Several reports explicitly noted that more quality in how PVCAs are carried out could have led to more leveraging. Some challenges cited included the *one-off nature* of some PVCAs (Bangladesh, 2015; Philippines, 2015); the degree of *variety of instruments* applied in the PVCA for deeper analysis (Honduras, 2016); the *quality of facilitation* (oPt picture power report, 2015); and the need to have *more direction* about how PVCAs are carried out and which tools/exercises are non-negotiable, as this may affect leverage (PVCA baseline review, 2012). The same report mentions that the difference between general participatory approaches and PVCAs, and between risks and needs, would need to be better explained to ensure coordination from programme officers and partners across CA. Reports from Haiti called for more supervision and noted the challenges of checking on action plans after some years: *“updating the PVCA document written in 2012 has been difficult as the people who participated in the PVCA before are hard to find”* (e.g. Community Dos-Bois-Rouge planning report, Haiti, 2015).

4.2.2. The second and third reasons cited in the reported cases were the **brokering role of partners and community representatives** between the communities and other actors (cited 16 and 11 times). These were often cited together. Comparatively, the role of CA was cited twice (this is logical as it is partners who work with communities directly). For instance, the oPt picture power report (2015) notes how: *“a system had been established through the PVCA process whereby PARC brokered relationships with other NGOs, who then dealt with the protection committee, who outlined what the community needed and relayed information for discussion back to the community”*. An interviewee added: *“YMCA approached them [leveraged actors] and convinced them of the PVCA approach”*. The empowering relationship (or not) of partners with communities was also noted by an interviewee. Similarly, the Bangladesh report (2015) mentioned that the: *“institutional linkages of the community [were] enhanced to a great extent where local leaders played a key role”*.

A lesson from the Honduras report (2016) is the need for a greater involvement by the partner’s senior management staff in daily project activities and particularly in important events such as the PVCAs and Action Plans, rather than leaving the facilitator alone. Reports from Haiti also called for more CA

supervision and noted the challenges of checking on action plans after some years: *“Updating the PVCA document written in 2012 has been difficult as the people who participated in the PVCA before are hard to find”* (e.g. Community Dos-Bois-Rouge planning report, Haiti, 2015). Feedback to this review also noted the importance of partner facilitation skills during the PVCA process and their commitment to learning from their approach yearly.

This would suggest that the **causes of leveraging may lay as much in the existence and quality of PVCAs as in the brokering capacity and reputation of partners and community leaders**. For the case of PARC’s leveraging from Save the Children (Box 2, page 9), factors cited included the PVCA’s capacity to identify risks (not needs) but also PARC’s *accessibility* to certain communities and areas in Gaza and the West Bank and its *good relationships* with volunteers, as noted by an interviewee.

4.2.3. Other three reasons cited (5-6 mentions) included the **commitment, experience and organising that a community may already bring to the leverage process** although it was not always clear if this referred to previously existing community organising or to organising skills developed during the PVCAs, e.g. committees. Other reasons mentioned included setting a **clear advocacy plan, training and tools (e.g. a petition)** and the **alignment of PVCAs with governmental processes**. Note that most of the cases had multiple responses, thus the same example may have given explicit value to PVCAs, brokering role of partners and advocacy plans. Feedback to this review added the importance of a community’s ownership of action plans.

Communities have different capacities to own the PVCAs and leverage resources. The annual review in the oPt (2015) ranged communities as ‘strong’, ‘middle’ and ‘weak’. Factors included seniority of individuals involved from within the communities, continuation communities in the project (strongest ones) vis-a-vis new and Bedouin groups with low levels of literacy and strong cultural practices, e.g. spatial separation of men and women (weakest ones). The Honduras report (2016) noted hindrances brought by the educational level. The community cohesion and intensity of power relations is another factor, as noted in an interview:

“The protection groups in the West Bank have been crucial [these were created by the PVCAs], have led in lobbying organisation, coordination – all sorts... the equivalent body in Iraq (M&E committees) were pretty powerless as they had to answer to the more senior group – the actual power holders in the community – invisible hand which has control, despite amount of work put in by communities”.

An added value to PVCAs cited is when they come accompanied by additional training on advocacy and rights and the use of the action plan with local authorities and other NGOs (oPt picture power report, 2015). This is linked to aligning PVCAs with governmental processes. A PVCA-expert staff member emailed: *“the actual responses by local government, however, also depend on the priorities of the specific county governments, so any PVCA priority which aligns best would have a better chance of being financed”*. Likewise, the PVCA baseline review (2012) noted that: *“understanding local government priorities and budgeting through more interaction with LGUs [Local Government Units] will support a more efficient PVCA action planning process”*. In 2015, the Kenyan Outcome Assessment repeated: *“the PVCA planning and review process has been largely separate from local government planning and we now need to better emphasise our advocacy links between the community and local government”*. In India (2016), some communities were reported to link their priorities to those in government plans.

This may suggest that **more attention should be given to linking PVCAs to openings in governmental schemes for better leveraging**. This is likely to translate into adding contextual information on governmental schemes and decentralisation processes when PVCAs are undertaken with the community. Equally, some reports suggest attention to the participation of leverage actors during the

PVCA process, for instance: *“where possible, LGU officials should be part of the PVCA team and process”* (PVCA baseline review, 2012). This can serve for other leverage actors such as NGOs and the private sector. For instance, for Save the Children in the oPt, they analysed: *“the PPA before implementing DRR [Disaster Risk Reduction] work in other communities with the YMCA... meeting with the Protection Group to learn from their experiences, and then implementing activities based on this learning in a non-PPA funded community, where a PVCA volunteer from the YMCA did a PVCA”* (Theory of Change for Middle East Resilient Livelihoods PPA, 2014-15). Several reviewers of this document agreed on the importance of this point. A reviewer added that it is not only about linking PVCAs to governmental schemes but about increasing partner confidence and understanding of these schemes, including budgets.

Linking to governmental schemes is also important to redirect other priorities that CA cannot fund.

The PVCAs naturally identify risks outside of the theme of the programme, which may be specifically tailored to fund disaster risk reduction and livelihoods. These risks could prompt an initial focus for leverage, particularly from relevant governmental institutions and other actors. This enables partners and projects to contribute to aligning their work with the government and positioning themselves for future opportunities even when there may not be government schemes at the time, as noted during feedback to this review.

Finally, **other minor causes mentioned** (1-3 times) in the leverage cases reported **included**: the role of the media and technology in leveraging resources including using cameras and photography to document as well as support from media bodies for advocacy; the brokering role of CA and allied NGOs; cultural adaptation of PVCAs; involvement of leverage actors in the PVCAs; rights and power training and awareness in PVCAs; the role of research and of experts (i.e. market specialist); information sharing beyond dissemination; and having a written proposal.

4.3. Country factors influencing leverage cases

The causes noted above that help (or constrain) leverage resources can be seen as micro factors, or those one can observe and then act upon with relative ease. Reports also reflected views on **country factors enabling or limiting leverage cases**. For instance, an oPt report cited the existence of NGOs that fund projects as a benefit in the oPt and a limitation in Iraq: *“the context in Iraq is very different to that in oPt where there are hundreds, if not thousands of NGOs present... the sources and amounts of funding available for development programmes in oPt far exceed those in Iraq”* (Theory of Change for Middle East Resilient Livelihoods PPA, 2014-15).

The existence of **other NGOs working with participatory approaches** may help communities to be more familiar with the PVCAs, find them useful, and obtain more potential leverage (e.g. the ‘Reflect’ approach in the Afghanistan report, 2016). The Burkina Faso report (2014) also notes how some NGOs have similar approaches and are, in some cases, developing action plans with communities too. However, this depends on the area as in some parts: *“other partners have their own priority villages and intervention logic”* (Burkina, 2014).

In turn, Burkina and DRC reports note the **lack of open and/or resourced governments**: *“communal authorities have very tightly constrained budgets”* (Burkina, 2014). And: *“communities conducted many advocacy works but the response or feedback from authorities continues to be great challenges, especially in Kinshasa... most of risks selected require more investment in terms of funds because [of] those flood[s], erosion, youth unemployment with all their consequences”* (DRC annual PPA, 2015). The same was noted for oPt, which also shows the role of power dynamics within governments. As an interviewee noted: *“the West Bank is a safer environment than Gaza, where there is nothing the government can do. In the West Bank,*

there is corruption but some sort of structure. Lots of money being pumped into Palestinian Authorities. Don't know if it's about exposing the misuse of money - [communities] knowing they are able to get something".

The opposite, a more functioning government positively affecting PVCAs, was reported to happen in Kenya (outcome assessment, 2015): *"the devolution of powers happening at a national level has created a fertile environment for this kind of activity [PVCAs]... however, we are not seeing the systematic inclusion of community priorities or engagement with formal planning processes".* All in all, leverage can still be difficult if the devolution of powers happens in principle but not in practice.

Finally, certain groups show less engagement with PVCAs such as **nomadic groups** in Northern Kenya where the levels of community participation were lower (outcome assessment, 2015). In Honduras (2014/15, 2016), the presence of **gangs in urban contexts** had a negative influence over PVCAs and project outputs. Participants were unsure of each other's membership, and doubted on whether members could have gang connections or direct affiliations, which hindered open discussions. In Iraq, many **people were engaged in the conflict** and could not be included in the PVCAs (humanitarian PPA thematic report, 2014/15). An interviewee compared the relative stability of the oPt to Iraq: *"the context in loPt lends itself well to this kind of work... volatile but not as volatile as Iraq. Risks are immediately obvious – settlements, loss of land, no water, no agriculture. All communities had similar issues".*

Thus, some see PVCAs as working best in development contexts, including in countries with emergency situations. For instance, the Bangladesh report (2015) noted that PVCAs are perceived to be especially **useful in non-emergency situations** where its integrated and inclusive approach to disaster risk management and development can best be delivered. Yet, a DRC report observed that many donors focus on supporting emergency work in Eastern DRC, thus becoming difficult to leverage funds for development work (CBCA PPA annual report, 2015). The same was noted for Iraq: *"most NGOs in Iraq are directing humanitarian funds to the overwhelming IDP [internally displaced people] and refugee crisis, rather than supporting local communities. Consequently, REACH [Iraqi partner] has a significant challenge when supporting communities to leverage funding from other organisations and sources"* (Theory of Change for Middle East Resilient Livelihoods PPA, 2014-15).

Despite the challenges, five leverage cases were noted for both the DRC and Iraq. Feedback to this review notes that Iraq saw some small successes despite the programme being only 2 years old and the many delays due to the conflict in the first year. A longer period to implement and more facilitation support could have helped make the PPA more successful in Iraq.

5. Conclusions

The **80 leverage cases reported** and the **1,273,389 GBP raised** are reasons for celebration. The importance of communities leveraging resources and services through PVCAs does not only lay on the cases reported and the amount raised but also on the way this was leveraged – based on local means and initiative. The number of cases is likely to be higher than 80 as there were cases that we could not include because of their lack of detail. Despite that, we think the review provides pioneering analysis on the relatively new area of community leverage. We extract two main reflections from this review:

(1) A leverage approach to PVCAs. The review helped make visible elements that could be integrated in project design towards strengthening leverage. These include building power sensitivity into PVCAs to assess the ability to leverage (as was noted in the learning review on power), inviting state and other leverage actors to shadow the PVCAs from the start, linking PVCAs to existent governmental initiatives and inversely matching partner budgets with leverage capacity.

The PPA already took steps towards factoring leverage in the PVCAs. Feedback to this review noted that action plans gradually aimed to be more specific by doing **stakeholder power mapping** with

partners and communities to identify who communities could engage with for leverage. Similar analysis is being done in the new [Health Legacy programme](#). On the other side, reviewers agreed that more work needs to be done to **strengthen PVCA's links with governmental processes**.

There also seems to be an **underuse of leverage actors available**. Most of the cases leveraged from non-state actors were provided by other NGOs, few cases were found from the private sector and media and none were reported from academia or faith organisations. In turn, this may hint at a parallel underuse of partnership and networking potential, especially when considering CA and partners' historic expertise on brokering collaborations as well as CA's partnership approach.

A final element to the leverage approach is the **role of budget for partners** in leveraging. As noted during the feedback, the availability of external resources in the oPt context made CA plan for a reduced budget for partners, which in turn forced partners to seek for resources externally from the start. That did not happen in places like Afghanistan until much later. CA can consciously tailor partner budgets towards gradually pushing for increased leverage in PVCAs depending on the country context.

(2) Challenges in finding leverage data. Data collection for this review proved difficult as it largely depended on the availability of existing reports and the extent to which these reports mentioned leverage cases *from* PVCAs. Data was often unavailable, indirect or incomplete and the quality of reporting differed between country programmes significantly. We found many PVCA planning reports but fewer documenting and assessing finished actions and change.

However, **good practice at reporting leverage already exists** from Bolivia, Kenya and the oPt. These explicitly articulated the links between PVCAs and leverage and gave detailed accounts of each PVCA leverage case including what happened, when, where, who got involved, how much was leveraged and why leverage happened. The oPt was particularly exhaustive in reporting on all communities, regardless of how well they did. Financial amounts of what was leveraged were often included too.

In short, developing a leverage approach from the onset provides ownership and sustainability and helps redirect action plans that CA cannot support to the government and other leverage actors. For instance, while the PPA was conceived to fund action plans on disaster risk reduction and livelihoods, leverage work contributed towards supporting action plans on other themes equally important to the communities CA worked with. Likewise, documenting and sharing leverage cases more systematically is key to enable CA to capture, understand and communicate its own added value, reach and impact.

6. Recommendations

The two recommendations – a leverage approach to PVCAs and better reporting and storing of leverage data – follow the project cycle and relate to PVCA leverage planning, implementation and reporting.

Recommendation 1: Take a leverage approach to PVCAs. This means thinking 'leverage' from the onset, especially with government actors – engage more diverse leverage actors, partnerships and collaborations in the PVCAs. We need to be more intentional about wanting to generate leverage from diverse actors, including the government but also the private sector, media, academia, faith organisations and other kinds of partners as part of country strategies and programme design.

PVCAs could be better informed by and connected with governmental initiatives where possible for state leverage and sustainability. CA and partners could inform communities on governmental schemes and decentralisation processes as part of the PVCA process to discuss how these can link up and respond to their identified risks.

Specific training to CA staff and partners could be done to map leverage actors (e.g. other NGOs working in the area) at the community level and explore the pros and cons of these collaborations for leverage. Contextual analysis and stakeholder power mapping can be useful for this, as was gradually done in PPAs and now with the Health Legacy. In turn, advocacy and rights packages can be tailored to those governmental schemes and other leverage options – rather than having an advocacy standard training. Likewise, state actors and non-state leverage actors can be invited to observe PVCA processes. This may have some budget implication such as covering local authorities for transport.

Finally, partner budget can be tailored to the partner’s capacity to leverage depending on its organisational strength and country challenges and opportunities. This means that the more capacity the partner has for leverage, the lesser the budget support should be, as noted for the case of oPt. When leverage capacity is more reduced, a gradual approach should be taken, as seen for Afghanistan.

	Recommendation 1: Take a leverage approach to PVCAs
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● State awareness – inform local people on government schemes and decentralisation processes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Power analysis – e.g. stakeholder power mapping to identify leverage options
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Networking – invite state and other leverage actors to shadow PVCAs
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Partner budgets – tailor partner budgets to their leverage capacity

Source: own elaboration; image: colourbox.com

Recommendation 2: Improve the reporting and storing of leverage data. More investment could be done to ensure that an increasing number of countries report on leverage. The countries facing major reporting problems could be identified and supported. This could be done by sharing existent good reporting practice from Bolivia, Kenya and the oPt.

During the feedback of this review, we discussed how this recommendation could be more tailored to the reporting systems we already have in CA. An integrated way to take this forward could be to include a question on PVCA leverage in CA’s annual reporting process if this has not yet been done. This section would ask for a description of leverage examples, including *what was leveraged, when, where and how; who the resources were leveraged from and who benefited from this leverage; and, finally the reasons that contributed to the leverage.*

However, this solution is now exhaustive on the overall situation of PVCA leverage as it is likely to only showcase the best leverage cases. Hence, we also discussed with reviewers whether it was pertinent to ask country and partner staff for some minimum documentation requirements specific on PVCA progression to be kept on CA’s intranet. This was to offset the fact that PVCA *planning* documents were found on the intranet during this review but this was less so for PVCA *results* documents.

We agree with this review’s feedback that copying/photographing original action plans (to be kept by communities/partners) is daunting and that what is interesting is not the action plans themselves but the analysis of change they support. Yet, we do think that the current situation of not having comprehensive evaluation data on what happens to PVCAs is not optimal either. We suggest that at least *one country summary planning report* and *one country summary results report on action plans* should be uploaded by partners or country staff on the Intranet/Promise every one or two years. The oPt is an example that this is possible although we acknowledge country capacity differences.

This is still a daunting task – in the PPA, each partner worked with at least 10 communities, meaning 10 reports per partner. Yet, evaluation and learning time at partner and country level is essential. Budget could be reserved for meetings to bring partners together to discuss PVCAs and a special

rapporteur can be in charge of collecting results and learning. At the international level, this can help CA to keep track of PVCA effectiveness as the umbrella organisation. As a reviewer noted, PVCAs were never used as part of an M&E tool but: “if we revisited and updated PVCAs which we should, we could also compare updated action plans at different times to see how the risk profile has changed”.

CA should also be working with partners to ensure the PVCA documentation is well stored with them and accessible to the community. Care could also be taken to ensure that community groups themselves are accountable internally and share their action plans and results so that it is as accessible as possible to the rest of the community, for instance, through noticeboards. The learning meetings with partners could be an opportunity to see how they did this.

Finally, the management of PVCA data could be better organised across CA so that the different programmes using PVCAs can learn from each other. A specific intranet page on PVCAs (and other participatory approaches in CA) could be created towards that. If a specific PVCA page is not seen as the best option, as a reviewer noted, spaces for coordinated cross-programmatic learning on PVCAs should be reinforced. This is key as CA moves towards using PVCAs in multiple programmes. In the longer term, PVCA learning could be shared with external audiences such as supporters and participatory tool practitioners through an online platform, e.g. the PPP site.

Recommendation 2: Improve the reporting and storing of leverage data



- **Country support** – identify and support countries with reporting challenges
- **Annual reports** – include a question on PVCA leverage in the annual reports
- **PVCA tracking** – ensure one planning and one results summary report every 1 or 2 years at country level
- **Community accountability** – have mechanisms to ensure partners and communities share PVCAs
- **Cross-programmatic learning** – reinforce spaces for coordinated meetings and potentially a PVCA intranet page

Source: own elaboration; image: iconsetc.com

¹ Background to this section was mostly taken from *Christian Aid (2016) Power in the PPA: A Learning Review, Christian Aid: internal report*, and interviews. Note that this was a desk and interview based review and talks about PVCAs indirectly.

² For an introduction, see *Christian Aid (2009) Christian Aid Good Practice Guide: Participatory Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment, Christian Aid: London*, which is a PVCA guide developed to support staff.

³ Exceptions are Ethiopia on health (which began on year 2 of the PPA), Iraq (only 2 years), Peru (which was removed at the end of year 3) and Honduras and Haiti (which began on year 4).

⁴ This is an internal report with no shareable link.

⁵ These included: 1) the earlier a process of leverage starts the more leverage is likely to be successful; 2) the earlier partners began working with communities, the more leverage is likely to be successful; 3) the more senior or popular a person leading it, the more leverage is likely to be successful; 4) the stronger the types of power individual influential actors have across the different stages of the PVCA process, the more likely the process is to respond to their request/s; 5) increasing individual or collective power won't necessarily correspond to increased success in leveraging resources in the face of very strong power over; 6) the more revisiting of PVCAs exist, the more improved leverage is likely to be.

⁶ All the secondary data docs reviewed can be consulted in this [appendix](#)

⁷ The full list/database of leverage cases is available on request

⁸ All the secondary data docs reviewed can be consulted in this [appendix](#)

⁹ When public and non-public resources were leveraged at the same time, we categorised it as public.

¹⁰ Other NGOs – World Vision; Save the Children; NGO Development Center NDC; Riwaq (NGO); Dan Church Aid; Palestinian Counseling Center; Arab Centre for Agricultural Development; World Vision (twice); Aide Medicale Internationale; Joint Aid Initiative; Africa Medical Research Foundation; African Sand Dams Foundation (ASDF, NGO); ACDI-VOCA; Finn Church Aid; and two unknown NGOs.

¹¹ Private sector – Private owner; Royal Industrial Trading Co; Engineers; Water company Aguas de Illimani; and a private wood company.

¹² Para-states/other states – the French Consulate in Jerusalem (twice); the Fonds Social de Développement (FSD); and MONUSCO.

¹³ PARC's PPA budget. CA and CA partner leverage were counted only if they were complementary to leverage from other actors.

¹⁴ We used the [Qanda converter](#) and the [Bank of England inflation calculator](#). More details about the calculation are available on request.

¹⁵ Only the funds used for PVCAs were counted – 325,000 euros out of a total of 2 million euros for the full project.