

# **Impact Analysis**

**of**

## **Christian Aid DRR/Resilient Livelihoods Programming**

**in**

### **Burkina Faso 2008 - 2013**

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January 2014

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

After five years working to support disaster risk reduction (DRR) and resilient livelihoods in Burkina Faso, Christian Aid wanted to understand the extent to which this investment had helped the communities (or not) to become more resilient to the recurrent threats that they faced. This report sets out the findings of an analysis commissioned by Christian Aid and carried out by a consultancy team, comprising Tamsin Ayliffe (international consultant), Adama Belemvire (national consultant) and Lucien Oubda (national consultant).

### **Background**

The key objectives of the intervention were to mainstream disaster risk reduction (DRR) into community development work carried out by Christian Aid's partners and to elevate DRR as a policy priority through civil society participation in the preparation of local and national development plans, with the goal of **reducing community vulnerability to future shocks and crises**.

There have, in fact, been two projects implemented during the five year period: one completed and one on-going. From 2008 to 2010 Christian Aid implemented the DFID funded Building Disaster Resilient Communities (BDRC) programme; then, in 2011, funding for a further three years was secured from the Conflict Humanitarian, Security and Justice security (CHSJ) Programme Partnership Agreement (PPA). For simplicity, these two projects are referred to throughout the text collectively as 'the project' or 'the intervention'.

Christian Aid sought to achieve the goal and overall objectives of the project through six key mechanisms:

1. supporting the participatory development of village DRR plans that would be actively used by communities and ensure increased attention to the DRR priorities of vulnerable men and women in the plans of communal authorities and other NGOs
2. part-funding these DRR plans, enabling the implementation of practical disaster mitigation activities by poor and vulnerable households
3. promoting a multiplication effect, whereby households not directly benefiting from project-funded activities learn from others and take up disaster mitigation activities
4. setting up and supporting village level early warning (EW) committees that communicate early warning information between communities and local authorities and take early action as required, resulting in reduced disaster losses
5. supporting downward accountability through implementation of the principles and practices of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) initiative
6. adding value to the programme through effective partnership working

### **Methodology**

In order to assess the extent to which project objectives were achieved and the factors that drove and constrained success, we converted these mechanisms into six testable hypotheses and used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to assess them.

A number of methodological challenges were encountered in the quantitative study: in both accurately measuring changes over the five year period and in attributing observed changes

to the intervention, or other causes. However, the mixed methods approach enabled us to double check and enrich our findings, for example, combining beneficiary perceptions of impact with measurement of direct results of activities; and to thereby build up a good picture of the outcomes of the intervention.

## **Findings**

There is some evidence that the project has contributed to the goal of reducing vulnerability to future shocks and crises. Whilst the change in livestock holdings of beneficiary households over the past five years (the only proxy measure of resilience that we were able to assess with the limited available data) is not significantly different from that of non-beneficiary households in project villages, most beneficiary households do believe that their capacity to cope with climate-related threats has increased. Comparing beneficiary and non-beneficiary households in project villages, **beneficiary households are significantly<sup>1</sup> more likely than non-beneficiary households to perceive an improvement in their resilience over the past five years.**

Regarding the six mechanisms for achieving this impact, set out above, the evaluators find that the project has had some positive results.

In particular, the funding of practical disaster mitigation activities through project partners (mechanism 2) has brought real benefits for individuals and their households. The supported activities are tried and tested approaches in Burkina and most households were already carrying out the activities for which they have received support, prior to the start-up of the project. The project has brought incremental improvements in the uptake and effectiveness of these existing activities; and the most vulnerable households in targeted communities are no less (but no more) likely than others to have benefited from this direct support.

Other elements of the programme (in particular those relating to mechanisms 1, 4 and 5) have been more ambitious and innovative. The project has attempted to support communal authorities to mainstream DRR in communal plans; to introduce complaints mechanisms at community level (through HAP); and to link communities into national early warning systems through community EW committees.

However, these elements have been generally less successful. In some cases useful building blocks may have been put in place, but there is not yet any evidence of practical impact in these areas. In analysing the reasons for this, the evaluators conclude that the problem is not in the overall conception of the programme. The six programme mechanisms listed above are broadly appropriate and should have been sufficient to achieve the overall programme objective. The main problems appear to have been a disconnect between intended **outputs** on the one hand and **activities** and **inputs** on the other.

Firstly, the inputs (resources) have probably been insufficient to achieve the outputs. The whole Burkina BDRC/PPA has had a spend over five years of only £750k (so an average of £150k per year), whereas the objectives envisaged quite substantial results and impacts across a wide geographical area, comprising three provinces areas and ten communes.

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<sup>1</sup> This is a statistically significant result at the 95% confidence level.

Secondly, the design of activities has sometimes been inappropriate to achieve the outputs.

- Programming has been insufficiently informed by an understanding of the specific strengths and weaknesses of the current national system for addressing DRR and building disaster resilience and of where CA can add most value. For example, the focus on increasing attention to DRR in the recently developed communal plans has not been informed by an analysis of the DRR strengths and weaknesses of the previous round of plans; and, whilst interesting action research was carried out under BDRC into how to link communities into the national early warning system, its useful recommendations have not really informed programming.
- Whilst the focus on DRR mainstreaming and building downward accountability (through HAP) is valid and important, there has probably been too much focus on formal training, at the expense of support in the development of practical tools and on-going support to implementation.
- Excessive geographical spread of the programme has dissipated whatever impacts may have been realisable had resources been concentrated in a more limited geographical area. The programme has had insufficient critical mass for much influence in any particular commune; and large distances between villages mean high time and resource requirements for travel.

In chapter three we detail our findings; and chapter four details and explains our twenty-eight recommendations. The recommendations are also summarised below for ease of reference.

## **SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

### Cross-Cutting

**Recommendation one:** Ground programme design more explicitly in an understanding of the specific strengths and weaknesses of the existing national system for supporting DRR and promoting resilience; and of entry points and opportunities for CA to add value.

**Recommendation two:** Articulate the new programme theory of change more explicitly, use it actively to inform programme design at all levels and test it periodically for plausibility.

**Recommendation three:** Focus the interventions geographically and ensure stronger linkages between village, communal and national levels.

**Recommendation four:** Strengthen collaboration with other NGOs operational in project areas.

**Recommendation five:** Strengthen project documentation and information management to underpin effective M&E

**Recommendation six:** Review focus villages/communes periodically, with a view to either intensifying support or withdrawing from those where progress is slow.

**Recommendation seven:** Review the skills mix of CA and partner staff with a view to strengthening analytical, action research and advocacy skills.

**Recommendation eight:** Review partnerships and extend to include universities/ research institutes / think tanks / advocacy NGOs if necessary.

**Recommendation nine:** Work collaboratively with other NGOs to address the problem of excessive per diems for Government officials and training participants.

**Recommendation ten:** Give the project a more memorable name in local languages.

### Hypothesis one: DRR plans

**Recommendation eleven:** Strengthen PVCA methodology to include analysis of household level drivers of vulnerability and of the variations in vulnerability between households.

**Recommendation twelve:** Promote continued broad participation of all sections of the community after the PVCA, including in prioritisation of activities for funding.

**Recommendation thirteen:** If awareness-raising remains a key priority going forward, consider a wider range of tools, in particular make more use of radio.

**Recommendation fourteen:** In respect to awareness-raising objectives, carry out a baseline on knowledge, attitudes and behaviours (KAP) to underpin M&E.

**Recommendation fifteen:** In support of innovative practices, move beyond training courses and give more attention to the development of practical tools and to on-going support to their implementation.

Hypothesis two: Practical disaster mitigation activities

**Recommendation sixteen:** Strengthen beneficiary selection processes. At a minimum: clarify targeting criteria; post these criteria in a public place in the village; review a sample of selection decisions; and ensure access of all community members to a complaints mechanism.

**Recommendation seventeen:** Improve effectiveness of nutrition support, either by developing new recipes that use ingredients truly local and affordable in project zones; or supporting income-generating opportunities that enable mothers of young children to pay for the ingredients required by existing recipes.

**Recommendation eighteen:** Ensure that female-headed households benefit equally to male headed households from agricultural activities that build resilience.

Hypothesis three: Multiplier effects

**Recommendation nineteen:** Assess the opportunities and constraints to uptake of innovations in particular villages and for different groups of people.

Hypothesis four: Early warning system

**Recommendation twenty:** Ensure that village EW committees operate as part of the overall EW system.

**Recommendation twenty-one:** Follow up on recommendations of BDRC EWS Action Research report (Batta and Gubbels, 2010).

Hypothesis five: HAP

**Recommendation twenty-two:** Provide intensive support to HAP committees and partners in each zone to develop locally adapted HAP tools.

**Recommendation twenty-three:** Ensure that these tools not only enable the committee President to complain about partner staff, but also enable community members to complain in the case of abuses by the committee.

**Recommendation twenty-four:** Post (in relevant local languages) key information in a central point in village on: programme objectives; annual budget for village; key activities; beneficiary selection criteria and number of beneficiaries of each activity; beneficiary lists; and complaints mechanism and key phone numbers.

Hypothesis six: Added value of CA

**Recommendation twenty-five:** Clarify the roles, responsibilities and expected behaviours of each partner and set these out in a partnership agreement.

**Recommendation twenty-six:** Identify and address the reasons for delays in financial transfers from CA to partners.

**Recommendation twenty-seven:** Support cross-learning workshops between partners involved in the programme.

**Recommendation twenty-eight:** Further analyse and address the sources of communication challenges between partners / CA Burkina and CA London identified in the course of this evaluation.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

A huge amount of work goes into planning and organising an evaluation and the consultancy team is very appreciative of the efforts of everybody involved. Without this support the team would never have been able to access so much information in such a short time.

Specific thanks are due: to the staff of partner organisations - ODE, Reseau Marp and ATAD - who responded to our many e-mails requesting information, accompanied us on field trips and met with us several times to discuss the programme; to the community committees who set up meetings for us in villages, sometimes at short notice; and to the project beneficiaries who spent hours answering our many questions.

We would also like to thank the staff of Christian Aid in London and Burkina Faso who provided us with critical background documents and met at several stages in the process to provide orientation and feedback; the officials and staff of local authorities and de-concentrated state services; and the staff of other development agencies and NGOs active in the project zone who helpfully answered our many questions.

We feel that, thanks to all this support, we have managed to gain a good understanding of the BDRC and PPA programmes, though there are undoubtedly some remaining gaps. We hope that feedback on draft versions of this report will have further improved our understanding; the consultancy team takes responsibility for any remaining errors.

Finally we would like to signal our particular appreciation of the openness with which stakeholders responded to the initial presentation of findings of this review. We hope that this indicates that we have captured some important points that resonate with those involved in the project. The real test will be whether the users of this report find our analysis and recommendations useful in practice. If you do, we will be content that we have done our job well. We wish you all the very best of luck in the future with taking forward this important programme.

## **ACRONYMS**

ATAD:	Alliance Technique d'Assistance au Développement (programme partner)
BDRC:	Building Disaster Resilient Communities
CA:	Christian Aid
DRR:	Disaster Risk Reduction
EW:	Early warning
EWS:	Early warning system
HAP:	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
KAP:	Knowledge, attitudes, practices
NGO:	Non-governmental organisation
ODE:	Office de Développement des Eglises Evangéliques (programme partner)
PCD:	Communal Development Plan
PPA:	Programme Partnership Agreement (DFID funding instrument)
PVCA:	Participatory vulnerability and capacity assessment
RM:	Reseau Marp (programme partner)

## **INTRODUCTION**

After five years working to support disaster risk reduction (DRR) and resilient livelihoods in Burkina Faso, Christian Aid decided to commission some analysis to understand, from the perspectives of the communities they are working with, the extent to which this investment has helped the communities (or not) to become more resilient to the recurrent food crises that they have faced during this period. They are interested to better understand the contribution they had made and to draw out evidence of good practice, as well as lessons learned.

Christian Aid commissioned us to carry out this work and this report sets out our analysis, conclusions and recommendations.

At the outset of the period Christian Aid was using a disaster risk reduction framework. Since then, the organisation has further refined its approach, shifting to a focus on building 'resilience, defined by Christian Aid as ***'the power of individuals and communities to live with dignity, responding successfully to disasters and the opportunities and risks they face'***. In this report, in agreement with Christian Aid, the programme is evaluated against its own theory of change, which is set out in chapter two below and which is largely informed by a DRR framework. Forward looking recommendations are, though, informed by Christian Aid's current resilience framework.

**Chapter one** provides background information. Since this report is intended primarily for Christian Aid staff who are already familiar with the project, this information is kept very brief. We highlight elements that we consider to be particularly important to an understanding of the analysis presented later in the report.

**Chapter two** presents the approach and methodology used in the study. It discusses some of the challenges encountered in implementation and draws out lessons learned for future M&E of this and similar programmes.

**Chapter three** sets out the detailed findings of the evaluation. It considers in turn each of the six hypothesis of the theory of change. Using the findings of both the quantitative survey and the qualitative work, it considers the evidence for and against each hypothesis.

**Chapter four** summarises the findings, draws out the implications and presents the recommendations of the evaluation team for future resilience programming in Burkina Faso.

To some extent these chapters can be read as stand-alone elements. In particular, those interested primarily in M&E issues might want to focus on chapter two on methodology; and others who are mainly interested in the Burkina programme might want to skip or skim this chapter.

# **CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND**

## **1.1 Programme Objectives**

From 2008 to 2010 Christian Aid implemented the DFID funded Building Disaster Resilient Communities (BDRC) programme in nineteen villages in the Sahel and Northern regions of Burkina Faso, through three national partner organisations, ATAD, ODE and Reseau Marp.

The purpose of the BDRC programme was to mainstream disaster risk reduction (DRR) into community development work carried out by Christian Aid's partners and to elevate DRR as a policy priority through civil society participation in the preparation of local and national development plans, with the goal of reducing community vulnerability to future shocks and crises.

Then, in 2011 Christian Aid secured Conflict Humanitarian, Security and Justice security (CHSJ) Programme Partnership Agreement (PPA) funding and committed to a further three years of funding. Christian Aid's thinking had moved on and the new programme sought to implement Christian Aid's approach to Resilient Livelihoods. This is explained as follows in the Oct 2012 paper, 'Thriving Resilient Livelihoods: Christian Aid's Approach',

*'We believe we can promote a virtuous circle, where people are supported to strengthen their livelihoods and manage the risks that threaten them at the same time. This enables households and communities to build up 'buffers' – such as savings, know-how, good health, safe housing and access to support networks – so they are less vulnerable to the next shock. It also gives them a secure starting point for meeting new challenges and adapting to their situations as they continue to change in complex, unpredictable ways. We call this building a **resilient livelihood**.'*

The current report analyses impacts over the period 2008-13 against the programme's own theory of change, which is valid for the two periods and is set out in section 1.3 below.

## **1.2 Programme Structure and Activities**

The total budget for the BDRC programme in Burkina Faso over three years was approximately £420,000. Of this, £216,000 was allocated to programme partners to support project activities in the nineteen focus villages and to cover associated delivery and management costs. The remaining £204,000 was used by Christian Aid to: build capacities of partners, local authorities and other key stakeholders; to strengthen the focus of DRR in communal planning; to support the implementation of innovative approaches such as the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP); and to cover management and administrative costs.

The spend to date under PPA has been somewhat less at £330,000. Of this £187,000 has been for grants to partners and £147,000 for the range of CA activities and costs outlined above.

This budget appears fairly low and the project is widely described as a pilot, implying an intention to multiply the benefits in the future, either by taking the activities to scale, or by learning lessons from innovations to inform advocacy / policy engagement.

The three programme partners, and their villages and zones of intervention under the BDRC were as follows:

ATAD: Sahel - Oudalan Province (eight villages in 4 communes)

ODE: Sahel - Soum and Seno Provinces (five villages in 3 communes)

Reseau Marp: North - Zondoma Province (six villages in 3 communes)

Partners and communes have remained the same under the PPA, though the number of villages has doubled to 38 in total. However, this evaluation only considered those villages supported during both the BDRC and PPA periods, on the basis that it was too early to expect to see impacts of the PPA intervention.

At the outset, in 2008, partners seem to have been selected on the basis of their existing partnership with Christian Aid. The choice of intervention zones was then driven by the areas of operation of these partners. In choosing communes and villages within these zones, partners report that they prioritised: villages at risk of natural disasters, in which they were informed by a recent report from WFP; and villages that they knew from previous experience to be dynamic.

The first step for the BDRC project was to carry out a Participatory Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment over three days in each of the 19 villages. This approach is set out in detail in CA Guidelines. In brief in Burkina it consisted of the following key steps: firstly, a BDRC committee was put in place; then the history of the village in relation to natural resource management and disasters was documented; women's, men's and youth working groups identified key natural disaster-related risks facing the village and prioritised these; these analyses were brought together to develop a DRR action plan, which was discussed and agreed in a full community meeting.

During this process, it was explained to each community that the project would not be able to fund all activities in the plan, but that the community would be expected to initiate some actions themselves, to fund seek from other organisations and to advocate to the local authorities. Prioritisation of actions for CA funding was not discussed as part of PVCA, perhaps because it was assumed that funding for other priorities would be forthcoming from elsewhere.

Once CA funding of activities was decided, the partners worked in collaboration with village committees in the implementation of those activities. Processes were similar, though there were slight institutional variations between zones. For example, some partners worked with BDRC committees on all activities and others worked mainly with the existing village development committees, only setting up specific BDRC committees for beneficiary selection and for accountability work related to the HAP initiative.

Key activities that were eventually supported included the following: contour bunds (training, equipment and transport of stones); provision of improved seeds; gardening (improvement of gardening plots, provision of equipment and training); enriched porridge (training and demonstration/feeding sessions); animal rearing (grants for purchase of goats/sheep/chicken, training in preparation of animal fodder); compost pits (equipment and cement); improved stoves (training); income-generating activities (grants/interest-free loans).

Early-warning committees were set up and supported in Soum and Seno and anti-locust committees were set up, trained and equipped in Oudalan. In addition, training was provided under the programme (from the CA part of the budget) on advocacy to project partners; and on DRR and HAP to community leaders, project partners and local authorities/technical services.

Whilst variations in activities between villages were somewhat informed by the PVCAs, there was a degree of standardisation of activities within a zone and the number of beneficiaries per village was the same regardless of the size of the village. Also, certain activities that came up in the problem analysis part of the PVCA, such as literacy training, never made it into the action plans. This appeared to be due to the understanding of partners that literacy training was not an 'allowable' activity under the BDRC project.

There was also some curious variation in activities between zones. For example, only in Zondoma was animal-raising supported through the provision of animals, as this did not emerge as a priority in the PVCAs in Soum, Seno or Oudalan. It is interesting to consider the reasons for this particular variation. Given the importance of pastoralism in the Sahel, it seems unlikely to be explained by context. It seems possible that it may have been driven by differences in the way the scope of the project was explained by different partners.

## **CHAPTER TWO: APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY**

### **2.1 Approach**

We used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods in the assessment. The anticipated benefits of this mixed methods approach were that: the use of quantitative methods would ensure that whatever results could be quantified would be; using qualitative methods would enable us to identify the processes and dynamics that underpinned successes and failures; and that the use of two approaches would enable us to triangulate and enrich our results.

It was initially proposed that the quantitative element should involve assessment of high level project impacts e.g. improvements in overall resilience of households or reduction in disaster losses in project villages that were attributable to the project. However, it quite quickly became from document review and the first field visit that it would not be possible to reliably quantify higher level impacts for the following reasons:

- There were no specific baselines at impact, outcome or output level
- There would be a serious challenge of attribution of any observed changes to the BDRC/PPA intervention. We already knew that there were no randomised control villages, but we further discovered: that project villages had been chosen partly because they were more dynamic. This meant that we could not assume them to be typical and that the selection of neighbouring villages as pseudo-controls would be problematic. Also, other similar interventions had been carried out in the project zones, some at larger scale than BDRC/PPA, which would make it difficult to detect the impact of BDRC/PPA.

As a result, we concluded that, in the quantitative element, we needed to focus primarily on measuring results of specific project activities, rather than higher level impacts. Through qualitative analysis we hoped to be able to tease out both the factors that had contributed to results and the likely knock-on impacts of these results.

Our next challenge was to identify the results we actually needed to measure and assess. The evaluation team found itself faced with eight logframes. Each partner had its own logframe for both BDRC and PPA; plus there was a Christian Aid logframe for both programmes. Whilst clearly addressing similar themes, each logframe defined different expected results, indicators and targets and there was no clear hierarchy or nesting structure.

For example, under BDRC: ATAD was the only partner to have objectives related to increasing access to water; RM the only one to address risks of epidemics; and ODE the only one to mention HAP. Even where there was overlap of thematic areas, outputs were structured and sequenced differently within the logframe; and targets were differently expressed and impossible to aggregate. See **Table 1** for targets from the three partner BDRC logframes in two key overlapping programme areas.

Similar inconsistencies were evident between the PPA logframes. For example, the ATAD PPA logframe targets are framed in terms of the number of villages that benefit, whereas the

RM targets concern the percentage of households in beneficiary communities that are impacted.

**Table 1: Selected Targets from BDRC Partner Logframes**

BDRC Programme	ATAD end of project target	ODE end of project target	RM end of project target
Implementation of DRR action plans	<i>Output 2 target:</i> at least 60% of beneficiary households can eat regularly during the year; cereal production increases by 10%; at least 60% of vulnerable people carry out an income generating activity.	<i>Output 1 target:</i> 1360 beneficiaries (of which 828 women) are equipped and trained to cope with hazards.	<i>Output 1 target:</i> by the end of the project, 50% of heads of household have adopted climate-sensitive agricultural practices and/or income-generating activities.
Early warning systems	<i>Output 1 target:</i> communities have reliable and up to date information on threats and preventative actions.	<i>Activity 2.1:</i> 180 people (of which 90 women) are trained on EWS. 50 people are equipped and ensure a functioning system.	<i>Output 2 target:</i> By the end of the project community disaster preparedness and response mechanisms are operational. <i>Result 2.2 target:</i> all provincial actors are made aware of the community response plan for epidemics (meningitis and smallpox). <i>Result 2.3 target:</i> community EW information is integrated in the regional EWS

We concluded that a necessary first step was to clarify with the CA team the programme theory of change. We developed together a summary diagram and then expanded this into six hypotheses that the evaluation could test, covering six key outputs of the project.

## **2.2 Programme Theory of Change: Research Hypotheses**

The six key hypotheses comprising the theory of change are as follows.

*Hypothesis 1: The participatory development of village level DRR action plans, together with DRR training at community and local authority levels, empowers communities to organise to take action themselves and to advocate and fund-see for support to their DRR priorities. This leads to an increased understanding of risks and attention to the DRR priorities of the whole community, including the priorities of the poorest/most vulnerable women and men, in communities' own self-supported action, as well as in the plans of both communal authorities and other NGOs.*

*Hypothesis 2: Project funding and community capacities support implementation of priority practical activities within the community action plan that directly benefit individuals and their households. As a result, the resilience of these direct beneficiary households in the face of natural disasters is substantially increased. Women and men from all sections of the community benefit from these activities and the poorest and most vulnerable households in the community benefit at least proportionately to others.*

*Hypothesis 3: There is a multiplication effect. Direct beneficiaries train or act as demonstrators for others in their village; the project provides some equipment for the*

*community as a whole; and the PVCA process raises awareness of how some key vulnerabilities can be addressed through capacities/resources already available within the community. As a result, there is an increase in uptake of priority DRR activities and benefits reach beyond the households directly supported by the project. Substantial numbers of households benefit indirectly in this way and the poorest and most vulnerable households benefit at least proportionately. Given the numbers reached directly and indirectly, project investments are cost efficient.*

*Hypothesis 4: Village level early warning (EW) committees play an important role in facilitating communication of early warning information between communities and local authorities, in both directions. As a result of their actions, if and when there is a serious threat, earlier action is taken and disaster losses are reduced.*

*Hypothesis 5: As a result of HAP training, community leaders, all community members, project partners and local authorities understand the principles of downward accountability. Community level mechanisms are established/ modified to improve accountability: Community leaders and members (including all sub-groups within the population): have access to relevant information in appropriate formats; participate meaningfully and exercise influence at all stages of the project cycle; and know how and where to complain about the actions of project stakeholders (community members, community communities, partners and CA etc.). These mechanisms are actively used and effectively managed. As a result of the project's introduction of HAP, accountability principles may even start to be applied by communities and local authorities in other contexts, beyond the project.*

*Hypothesis 6: Christian Aid adds value to the project as a partner. Partnership principles and expectations are clearly set out and agreed by all. Partners feel that training, mentoring, analysis and on-going support and feedback provided by Christian Aid has led to improvements in their BDRC/PPA programming practice in Burkina and can identify specific examples of this. This added value of Christian Aid represents good value for money.*

## **2.3 Methodology**

A different combination of methods and different sampling approaches were used to answer each hypothesis.

### **Methodologies for each Hypothesis**

Hypotheses 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 were addressed primarily through **qualitative methods**, complemented in some cases with some data from the quantitative survey. For example, the survey included questions on knowledge of project objectives, budget and complaints mechanisms, which were important in addressing hypothesis 5 about HAP.

In addressing hypotheses 1, 3 and 5, community meetings were held with groups of beneficiaries in ten purposively sampled villages. In choosing villages to visit we ensured that all three zones and partners were covered and that there was a mix of villages where the project had, in the view of partners, been highly and less successful (strong/medium or weak). The villages we visited are highlighted in bold in table one.

**Table 2: Project Villages**

Partners	Regions	Provinces	Communes	Villages	Main languages	Strong/medium/weak	Population
ATAD	Sahel	Oudalan	Gorom-Gorom	<b>Bidi</b>	<b>Fulfulde</b>	<b>medium</b>	<b>1234</b>
				<b>Korzéna</b>	<b>Sonrai</b>	<b>strong</b>	<b>1972</b>
				Ouro-Hesso	Sonrai	strong	1377
			Markoye	Markoye	Sonrai/ Tamashek	weak	6000
				Dambam	Sonrai	medium	1486
			Oursi	Oursi	Sonrai/ Tamashek	weak	1547
				<b>Boulél</b>	<b>Fulfulde</b>	<b>weak</b>	<b>1277</b>
			Tin-Akoff	Tin-Akoff	Tamashek	strong	5877
RMarp	North	Zondoma	Bassi,	<b>Kèra Douré</b>	<b>Moore</b>	<b>strong</b>	<b>2636</b>
				Lintiba	Moore	medium	1183
			Tougo	<b>Kindibo</b>	<b>Moore</b>	<b>weak</b>	<b>2561</b>
				<b>Kéléguem</b>	<b>Moore</b>	<b>medium</b>	<b>1979</b>
				<b>Tougo</b>	<b>Moore</b>	<b>weak</b>	<b>3960</b>
			Lèba	<b>Masboré</b>	<b>Moore</b>	<b>strong</b>	<b>1812</b>
ODE	Sahel	Soum	Arbinda	<b>Gaik-goata</b>	<b>Moore/ Gorounfe</b>	<b>strong</b>	<b>2245</b>
				<b>Boukèssé</b>	<b>Fulfulde</b>	<b>weak</b>	<b>682</b>
		Séno	Seytenga	Seytenga	Fulfulde	weak	3528
				Bandiédaga	Gourmantche	medium	2286
			Falangoutou	<b>Kargono</b>	<b>Gourmantche</b>	<b>strong</b>	<b>1305</b>

Since practical impacts of the early warning (EW) committees are only seen when the committee needs to respond to a risk, impacts will not otherwise be observable even if committees are strong. Therefore, to ensure meaningful findings with respect to hypothesis 4, a 'best case' approach was used. Partners were asked to identify committees that they believed to have successfully acted in response to a perceived threat and the evaluation examined these three cases in detail (Kargono and Gaik-Goata). Findings would, therefore, indicate the potential of the EW committee approach in the best case scenario and not the average benefit of these committees across all project villages.

Meetings with communal authorities, the province/commune based staff of ministries and other development agencies active in the zone also formed a key component of our qualitative analysis; as did the analysis of Government of Burkina communal plans and project training and action research reports.

Hypothesis 2 was addressed primarily through a **household survey**, complemented by qualitative findings. Distinct questionnaire modules were developed to assess the outcomes of each of five purposively selected project-funded activities: contour bunds, improved seeds, gardening, enriched porridge and livestock-rearing. These activities were identified with project partners as representing those activities expected to have led to important and measurable results for beneficiaries.

### **Household Sampling**

The total sample size for the quantitative survey was 313 people, of whom 180 were men and 133 were women (see table 3). 221 people were known to be direct project beneficiaries and, in addition to general questions, were asked detailed questions about a specific project activity. The other 92 were selected from the whole population of project villages and were then categorised into direct beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries according to their responses to the questionnaire. See Annex 2 for a further breakdown of the sample by village and zone.

**Table 3: The Sample**

	<b>Direct Beneficiaries</b>	<b>General population</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Men</b>	130	50	180
<b>Women</b>	91	42	133
<b>Total</b>	221	92	313

For direct project beneficiaries (those benefiting from one of the five project-funded focus activities) the sampling frame was the lists of beneficiaries of each activity in each village, provided to us by project partners. A sample was then selected through computer-generated random selection. The project has generally supported the same number of beneficiaries in each village, regardless of village size. Given this, the evaluation team ensured that, as far as possible, each village was equally represented in the overall sample. This meant that in the overall sample zones were represented in proportion to the number of project villages and beneficiaries in each. (See below, however, for a discussion of some challenges in practice.)

Indirect beneficiaries (members of beneficiary villages) were selected by a different form of random selection. Given that there were no available village household lists, enumerators were instructed to first select a quarter of the village randomly by throwing a dice, then to start in the middle of the quarter, spin a bottle, walk a given number of paces in the direction given by the bottle and interview the household in the nearest compound. Of course, some of these randomly selected beneficiary members were direct beneficiaries of the project and some were not. As part of the interview these respondents were asked whether or not they had in fact benefited from the BDR/PPA programme and their response recorded (see later for some challenges in practice).

We also intended to adopt a structured approach to sampling for the qualitative work. We planned to carefully select focus groups for the qualitative work from lists supplied by project partners of beneficiaries of activities not covered by the quantitative survey and participants

in the PVCA and training courses. In practice, however, this proved impossible. Some partners struggled to provide even partial lists of beneficiaries of those activities covered by the quantitative survey let alone others and, since sampling for the quantitative survey was the priority, we focused our efforts on obtaining the lists of beneficiaries of the five activities. Even when we did request to meet with particular individuals (e.g. committee members or those benefiting from specific activities) we often arrived in the village to find different people awaiting us.

This would have mattered more if we had found a very high level of understanding of the project and of HAP principles amongst community leaders and had wanted to check wider understanding; or if we had not been carrying out a complementary quantitative survey. However, in practice, the fact that we met with largely self-selecting groups did not seriously impede the qualitative work and dividing self-selecting participants into several sub-groups proved sufficient for our purposes.

### **The Survey Instruments**

In community meetings we asked open questions about project objectives, activities and benefits. We asked about how activities and beneficiaries were chosen, by whom and according to what criteria. We also asked about the HAP: understanding of the principles and their application in practice.

The questionnaire for the quantitative survey covered the following areas:

Section one: household composition (names and ages and disability/chronic illness status of all household members); main economic activities of household; livestock holdings now and five years ago; participation of household members on village committees

Section two: changes in perceived household disaster resilience in the past five years and main reasons; main external sources of support to the household in building disaster resilience

Section three: nature of BDRC/PPA support (if any) received by household; appreciation of BDRC/PPA project; knowledge of BDRC/PPA project, including how activities were selected, the village budget, PVCA and HAP.

Section four: tailored questionnaires for randomly selected beneficiaries of each of the five focus activities, covering: involvement in said activity now and five years ago; changes in activity profits, coverage, frequency etc. (as relevant to a particular activity); extent to which BDRC/PPA was the main source of support for this activity.

As can be seen, the lack of project baselines meant that, in order to assess change over a five year period we were obliged to ask respondents to recall their situation from five years ago. Given the long time frame, we only did this in relation to key and memorable issues (e.g. we could reasonably ask whether someone did gardening five years ago, but not what their annual profits were then). Even so, findings on changes are likely to be subject to some recall error.

More detail on specific questions asked are provided as relevant throughout the text of chapter three whenever findings are presented.

## **2.4 Methodological Challenges**

Two key methodological challenges were faced. One concerned the representativity of the sample and the second the extent to which changes (possible impacts) could be attributed to the project.

### **Selection of a Representative Sample**

The first problem was that partners were unable to provide complete beneficiary lists for all villages and activities. It is worth noting here that the incomplete lists meant that it was impossible for the evaluators to calculate the total number of people directly reached by each activity, which is an important gap in the evaluation findings. There were also some important patterns to the missing information, with implications for treatment of findings.

i) The gaps were most apparent in the lists of beneficiaries from earlier years and, as such, there was an evident bias in the sample frame towards more recent beneficiaries. This may be expected to affect findings to some extent. For example, recent beneficiaries may be more likely than earlier ones to be still carrying out the activity; and likewise somewhat less likely to have already been carrying out the activity five years ago. Observable gains might be lower as there will have been less time for benefits to accumulate; or they might be higher, as they will be less likely to have been wiped out by repeated shocks.

ii) The gaps were particularly pronounced in Oudalan, where, we discovered at a very late stage that central records of beneficiary lists had been lost. Here, in some villages and for some activities, our only option was to ask the enumerators to randomly select beneficiaries on arrival in the village, following an approach designed by the evaluation team. Whilst the approach, if correctly followed, would have enabled random selection, there were some challenges. The process was less under the control of the evaluation team and was at risk from any deviation by the enumerators from the instructions given. As we shall see below, in practice this was a substantial problem.

The second issue was that, whereas enumerators in the northern zone correctly used the respondent lists and correctly followed instructions as to what to do if respondents were missing, this was less the case in other zones, particularly Oudalan. This led to some imbalances in the final sample, for example, beneficiaries in the Sahelian zones were slightly under-represented and those in Zondoma slightly over-represented, whereas the opposite was true for households randomly selected from the population (largely consisting of non-beneficiaries). These imbalances could bias the findings. For example, where we see apparent differences between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, imbalanced sample sizes mean that these could actually be driven by differences between zones.

To ensure that these issues did not lead to mis-reporting of findings, various checks were conducted. For example, when we found a correlation in the sample as a whole, we disaggregated by zone, only reporting as key findings those that held for each zone separately, as well as the whole sample. Given the particular problems with the survey in Oudalan, we checked the data carefully for anomalies in villages in this zone and excluded the data where appropriate.

### **Attribution to the BDRC/PPA Project**

Where we identified changes, we faced the challenge of deciding whether these were likely to have been caused by the project or other factors. Initially, we proposed to use two key mechanisms:

- i) Comparison between changes experienced by direct beneficiaries within project villages and other households that had not directly benefited from any project activity. Here we would expect to see a 'dosage effect', whereby direct beneficiaries benefited more than others, even if there was some positive spillover.
- ii) Subjective attribution by beneficiary households of changes to the project. In both the focus groups and in the questionnaire we asked about the extent and nature of the benefits of BDRC/PPA.

However, a major unanticipated challenge was the huge confusion between projects displayed by beneficiaries. Whilst most people knew the type of support they had received, they often did not know the name of the project that had provided it. This was clear from our meetings in villages and from responses to the questionnaire. Furthermore, there was an apparent bias amongst respondents who were unsure of the source of support towards stating that the source of support was BDRC/PPA (perhaps because they assumed that if they were being questioned as part of an evaluation of this project they must have benefited from it.)

For example, respondents frequently reported both that they had already been carrying out an activity before BDRC/PPA started and that BDRC had introduced them to this activity. There were also respondents who stated both that cash or food aid were the most important source of support to them over the past five years and that BDRC/PPA (which did not provide such support) was the most important project.

This created a real challenge for the evaluators in attributing impact and affected both of the proposed mechanisms for attribution set out above.

Subjective assessments of the importance of the BDRC/PPA project and comparisons between this and other projects (mechanism (i)), were simply considered too unreliable to use, given the huge confusion between projects.

In terms of comparison of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, we carried out multiple analyses to ensure that we could be confident of a result, even if some beneficiaries were confused. For example, those beneficiaries who were found on lists supplied by the project were unequivocally identified as BDRC/PPA beneficiaries. Those non-beneficiaries selected

randomly from the village population and who confirmed that they had not benefited directly from a BDRC/PPA activity were classified as non-beneficiaries. Those selected in this same way, but who self-identified as beneficiaries were classified as of in-determinant status. To be sure of our findings, we carried out comparisons between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries three times: classifying the indeterminate group as beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and excluding them entirely.

## **2.5 Reflections on Programme M&E**

Based on the experience of conducting the evaluation, the evaluation team has a number of reflections.

The need to strengthen strategic M&E, through giving a more on-going attention to the programme theory of change, emerges as a key finding of the evaluation and is fully discussed in chapter four. To avoid repetition, this chapter focuses more on the operational underpinnings of an M&E system.

Firstly, we believe that were real advantages of using mixed methods for the current evaluation; and that these advantages were multiplied by the fact that the qualitative and quantitative elements were carried out by the same team. Our learning from the community meetings informed in many important ways both the design of the survey questionnaire and the checks that we carried out on the data. To give just two examples:

- reports in community meetings in Oudalan that there was a problem with accessing ingredients for enriched porridge meant that we included this in the questionnaire as one of the list of possible constraints to porridge preparation and could quantify the extent of the problem;
- finding in community meetings that beneficiaries were confused between projects, we carried out comprehensive checks of the data for evidence of such confusion, which enabled us to avoid the risk of misusing data biased by such confusion.

The lessons that we have learned as an evaluation team about our own approach concern especially the need to invest more in training and supervision of enumerators than we had realised. Although we carried out a one-day training course, spoke to enumerators regularly by phone and brought back several for a follow-up training day when the early questionnaires suggested they were facing challenges, this appears to have been insufficient in some cases.

As for lessons for the project, a common issue underlying many of the challenges we faced was the weak management of information. Beneficiary lists were incomplete; there was neither specific baseline information from 2008, nor any information on the status of households on their entry to the project; and there was no register of complaints received or actioned. Logframes were inconsistent in terms of both outputs and specific indicators; targets and achievements could never be aggregated across partners as they were often expressed differently, for example by one partner as a percentage and another as a number.

At a minimum, it is suggested that basic information on relevant village committees, on complaints and on beneficiary households be recorded and stored in a location to which both CA and project partners have access. For village committees, this information could include a participatory baseline capacity assessment, covering committee composition, current activities, training to date, linkages to local authorities etc. On complaints it could include anonymised information on complaints received, follow up action taken and complainant satisfaction (or not) with the response. For households it could include key information on household status on entry to the project, covering such things as name, gender and disability status of household head, number of adults and children in household, livestock holdings and other key assets, key livelihood activities and current engagement in the activities supported by the project.

Such information would not only facilitate independent evaluation, but also more rigorous regular monitoring. For example, if there were complete beneficiary data available, then anyone carrying out a monitoring mission could randomly select a number of beneficiary households from the list and ask to meet with them, which would guard against the potential biases inherent in meeting with a self-selecting community group. It would also be possible to keep track of how many households and individuals were reached, which would facilitate value for money analysis. If there were a complaints register then it would be immediately apparent to those monitoring the project if the complaints system was or was not being used. This would enable emerging issues to be identified much earlier and to be followed up with in-depth analysis as required.

If Christian Aid already has appropriate project software, or if an increase in programme funding enables such software to be purchased, then a computerised MIS system could be considered, perhaps with cloud storage of data to enable project partners access. This would enable regular monitoring reports to be easily uploaded, tracking progress of villages and even individual households over time. However, if not, basic information could simply be recorded on an Excel spreadsheet. In the view of the evaluation team there is much scope to improve the current management of information without the need for sophisticated or expensive software.

Another simple suggestion likely to facilitate M&E would be to give the project a more memorable name in local languages. Few beneficiaries could pronounce or remember 'BDRC/PPA'. If the name were more memorable, the problem of confusion between projects may be alleviated.

## **CHAPTER THREE: KEY FINDINGS**

This chapter sets out key findings of the analysis for each hypothesis within the programme theory of change. At the end of each section key findings are highlighted in bold.

### **3.1 Hypothesis 1**

*Hypothesis 1: The participatory development of village level DRR action plans, together with DRR training at community and local authority levels, empowers communities to organise to take action themselves and to advocate and fund-raise for support to their DRR priorities. This leads to an increased understanding of risks and attention to the DRR priorities of the whole community, including the priorities of the poorest/most vulnerable women and men, in communities' own self-supported action, as well as in the plans of both communal authorities and other NGOs.*

This hypothesis is rather complex and requires assessment of many dimensions of project activities. To simplify the analysis we consider firstly the process of development of the DRR Action Plans through the use of Participatory Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments (PVCAs). Secondly we consider how the DRR Action Plans, together with training provided through the programme, impacted action.

#### **Participatory Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments**

The first step of the BDRC project was to carry out Participatory Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments (PVCAs) in all target villages, in order to develop a village DRR Action Plan. The outcomes (and detailed process in the case of Soum/Seno) are well documented for every project village.

Many BDRC committee members remember the PVCAs and speak about them with some enthusiasm. For example in Gaik-Goata the Chief can still remember that the PVCA lasted three days and that ten people participated from each quarter of the village. In Kargono, committee members remember how they enjoyed some of the tools. However, the level of recall is not even across villages: in Boulel and Tougo even the BDRC committee had no recollection of the PVCA and no idea of how project activities had been selected.

According to the Christian Aid PVCA guidelines, PVCAs have multiple objectives:

- to complement baseline information for measuring impact
- to strengthen the participation of beneficiaries in decision-making
- to optimise the relevance and appropriateness of action and project investments

Assessing the PVCAs against their three stated objectives the evaluators have the following comments:

**Baseline information:** The PVCAs carried out in Burkina generated interesting qualitative background information on villages. Whilst this may have been useful for other purposes, it was of no use as a baseline for this evaluation, as the information was far too general to be

used in this way. More specific baseline information would have been immensely helpful to project monitoring and evaluation. Suggestions on what this might usefully include are set out in section 2.5 above.

**Strengthening the participation of beneficiaries in decision-making:** It is clear from the documented description of the PVCA approach that dozens of community members, including men, women and youth were actively engaged in working groups over three days in the analysis of risks and development of an action plan; and that there was also a community meeting to ratify the plan. This was confirmed by testimony of community leadership. In the quantitative survey we found that 9% of respondents remembered participating in the working groups of the PVCA and a further 21% in the community wrap up meeting.

However, a number of weaknesses in participation can be identified:

Firstly, only sedentary communities participated. Nomadic people in theory were invited to participate in the community wrap-up meeting where such communities were living in close proximity to the village, for example in Kargono. However, in practice, no-one can remember if they were there or not. In any case their participation was limited to the wrap up meeting, after the substantive work was completed; their different priorities were not explicitly considered. This is an important gap. Stakeholders told us that conflicts around pasture and water are a reality, especially in Oudalan, and this reality is reflected in the inclusion of a pastoralist sub-committee within the Government of Burkina Village Development Committee structure. To be fair to partners, this is probably more an issue of programme design than implementation. The fact that the primary unit of analysis was the village, rather than the commune, likely made it difficult to systematically consider the particular issues of mobile communities who only live in the area temporarily and often somewhat outside villages.

Secondly, according to the quantitative survey, participation in the PVCA did not necessarily equate to a perception of having participated in selecting project activities. Whilst 30% of respondents remembered having participated in the PVCA (either in the working groups or the community meeting) only 12% stated that project activities had been decided in a meeting in which they had participated. 31% believed that activities had been chosen either by the project partner or the BDRC committee. 47% simply didn't know.

<b>Table 4: How and by whom were BDRC Project Activities Chosen?</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Valid %</b>
1. Chosen by project partner	40	<b>13%</b>
2. Chosen by BDRC committee	53	<b>18%</b>
3. Chosen in a community meeting in which our hhold was present	35	<b>12%</b>
4. We understood they were chosen in a community meeting, but our hhold was not present	34	<b>11%</b>
6. Don't know	141	<b>47%</b>
Total	303	100%
Missing	10	
Total	313	

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, this intensive participatory process covered only the first stage of the process of project design: development of a long list of activities for inclusion in an action plan. Only some of these activities were eventually financed by Christian Aid and the process of prioritisation for funding was not at all participatory. Indeed even project partners found it somewhat opaque and some struggled to explain to communities the basis for funding decisions. From Christian Aid's side the lack of attention to participation in the prioritisation of activities for funding seems to have been based on the assumption that communities could find funding elsewhere for other priorities on their list. However, this assumption proved over-optimistic. Other partners have their own priority villages and intervention logic; and communal authorities have very tightly constrained budgets.

### **Relevance and appropriateness of action**

Beneficiaries and stakeholders reported that actions included in the DRR plan were generally appropriate to the risk profile in the target areas. Furthermore, taking account of the gendered division of labour in this context, the plans clearly include support both to activities that are primarily men's responsibility (such as constructing contour bunds and compost pits) and those in which women predominate (gardening, small-scale market trading, constructing improved stoves and preparing porridge). The PVCA may have helped ensure appropriateness, though it may also be due to the existing strong contextual knowledge of partners.

That said, lack of participation in subsequent stages of the project cycle may have somewhat weakened the detailed design of some activities. There was no participatory analysis of the opportunities and constraints to carrying out the proposed actions in a given village, though clearly in reality these constraints varied widely. For example: some communities can find stones and clay within walking distance for construction of contour bunds and improved stoves, but many cannot; the requirements for concrete to construct compost pits varies by soil type; and the availability and cost of the recommended ingredients for enriched porridge vary by area. The support provided by the project seems to have been very similar in all villages in a zone, perhaps missing opportunities to tailor support and undermining effectiveness in some cases (e.g. see section 3.2.2 on enriched porridge).

Also, and more fundamentally, although the title Participatory Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment suggests a focus on vulnerabilities, the analysis actually looked primarily at common climate-related hazards faced by the community. As clearly set out in 'Thriving, Resilient Livelihoods: Christian Aid's Approach', how people deal with a crisis is a function not only of the nature of the hazard faced, but also of the assets, capacities and resources that a household and community possess to mitigate, prepare for and respond to that hazard. In order to assess 'vulnerability' (or its converse resilience), the PVCA would have needed to unpack the community as an entity and to seek to understand the drivers of vulnerability and how and why these vary between households. In the absence of such an analysis there is no way of knowing for sure whether the proposed actions were or were not the most relevant and appropriate to address vulnerabilities.

Furthermore partners reported that in those new PPA villages in which PVCAs were conducted in 2011/12, community priorities could not be taken into account because 'the programme was already decided'. This seems to indicate a problem of sequencing and/or lack of flexibility in funding.

In sum, with respect to the documented objectives, the PVCAs in Burkina partly achieved their objectives of promoting participation and ensuring appropriate action plans, though with some limitations; they did not achieve the objective of creating a useful baseline for future M&E.

It should be added that both the Burkina Faso Christian Aid office and project partners in Burkina see the main benefit of PVCAs not in any of the above-mentioned areas, but rather in their value as an awareness-raising tool. They argue that prior to PVCAs communities felt helpless in the face of disaster risks and were unaware that they could take action to mitigate them; and that the PVCAs had a substantial impact on the awareness of communities of their capacity for action.

The evaluation team designed questions (in both the qualitative and quantitative elements) to shed as much light as possible on this issue. Findings included the following:

- In Soum /Seno increased awareness of capacity to take action to address disaster risks is perceived as a key benefit of the BDRC/PPA programme, mentioned as one of the top three benefits by over half of respondents. This benefit is not perceived as so important in other zones.
- On the other hand, understanding that the purpose of BDRC/PPA is linked to DRR is very limited, even amongst BDRC committee members. Most do not make the link to disaster risk management, but perceive the project as having more general humanitarian or developmental objectives (see section 3.5.2 for more on this).
- The vast majority of direct beneficiaries supported to carry out disaster risk mitigation activities were already carrying out the activity before BDRC/PPA support started. So, whether or not BDRC led to any change in understanding or attitude, there is no evidence that it led to major shifts in practice (see section 3.2.2 for more detail).

The evaluation team also suggests that, if changes in knowledge and attitudes were a key objective of the programme, it would have been helpful to have included a wider range of awareness-raising activities within the programme. Repetition of key messages is understood to be key to attitudinal and behaviour change, so even a best practice one-off PVCA would not have maximised awareness-raising impacts. Local radio is being increasingly used in Burkina as an awareness-raising tool and might have been effectively used within the programme. (See recommendation thirteen.)

Overall, the evidence on the extent to which PVCAs contributed to awareness-raising is inconclusive and this is not surprising given the data limitations. There are serious methodological challenges in assessing changes in knowledge and attitudes in the absence of a baseline. We recommend that if such changes are a key objective of future

programming then a KAP (Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices) baseline will be indispensable.

In sum, we can say that, whilst the PVCAs were highly participatory exercises and were valued by the community members who participated in them, they had a number of limitations. If Christian Aid is aiming for best practice in participation, it could usefully:

- clarify the objectives of the tool and ensure that these are agreed and shared by CA London, CA country offices and project partners
- strengthen the tool in line with agreed objectives, taking account of the above analysis (see recommendation eleven).

### **DRR Action Plans: Content and Use**

The anticipated value of the DRR action plans was not only as a guide to BDRC funding, but also as a tool to empower members of the community to take action themselves and to advocate and fund-secure for support to their DRR priorities.

Positive findings from the qualitative work included that in some villages the community still has the original 2008 action plan to hand and that in a few villages, including in particular Kargono and Masbore, BDRC and CVD committees believe the DRR action plan to have been a useful advocacy tool in engagement with communal authorities and other partners. However, in most villages, even those deemed highly successful by partners, such as Korizena, Kera Doure and Gaik-Goata, committees did not find the plans useful in this regard. This was due to a lack of other partners or to other partners having their own intervention logic. Committee members from Gaik Goata commented, 'we gave the plans to our relatives in town to help us find financing, but we had no luck.'

CA might want to re-think its approach to encouraging communities to fund seek from other on the basis of a DRR action plan developed through a CA-supported PVCA. This seems a rather one-way process and there may also be scope for CA to learn from and build on the work of others. Several other NGOs are carrying out similar activities in the same zones, as BDRC. For example, in Zondoma, Africare implemented a 5bn FCFA project over 5 years (2005 - 10), working in all 104 villages in the Province and supporting all activities supported by BDRC; in Oudalan the NGO Association pour le Developpement Communautaire (ADC) is supporting gardening in four of the eight BDRC villages; and the NGO REACH is supporting the recuperation of degraded land through mechanised techniques in BDRC programme communes. These NGOs have interesting approaches and are, in some cases, also developing action plans with communities. On at least one occasion when we asked to see the DRR action plan we were shown a plan developed with the support of another NGO. There would seem to be substantial scope for increasing collaboration, technical exchange and cross-learning in order to develop a harmonised approach drawing on the strengths of the various methodologies currently being used by different NGOs.

Going back to the use of the DRR plans as an advocacy tool with local authorities, even in cases where committee Presidents believed the action plans to have underpinned

successful advocacy, further analysis revealed other, more plausible, explanations for the positive outcomes.

For example the CVD President in Kargono believed that the existence of the DRR action plan had enabled him to successfully advocate for a health centre for the village. He seemed to have felt empowered by the existence of a written plan citing the health centre as a priority. However, further analysis suggested that the decision to build a health centre in the village was actually driven primarily by political considerations following the re-drawing of the Burkina Faso/Niger border. This meant that Kargono had become a strategically important border village. Investments in these villages, including the health centre in Kargono, will be made from a special national security related fund. The existence of a village DRR action plan probably played little, if any, part in this decision. The Prefect of the Commune was fully aware of the investment plans for this village, but had no knowledge of the existence of a DRR Action plan.

Another village, Masbore, links acquisition of their birthing centre to the DRR action plan. The DRR plan included the birthing centre and was developed just before the 2008 communal plan in which the birthing centre also figures. However, the identification of the birthing centre as a village priority pre-dates the PVCA and was previously included in the local development plan of 2005. Given this, it is difficult to attribute to the PVCA and DRR Action Plan more than a supportive role in an on-going process.

Furthermore, despite increasingly active engagement with communal authorities under the PPA, there is no convincing evidence to support the hypothesis that the existence of the DRR Action Plan, together with training provided by the project, led to greater and more appropriate attention to DRR within the recent round of communal development plans (PCDs).

Training on DRR took place in all three zones, but we were only able to meet with elected officials who had following the training in Soum and Seno. The Mayors of Falangoutou and Seytenga in Seno and the Deputy Mayor in Arbinda all had some recollection of the training. A recently elected mayor in Seno Province, the Mayor of Falangoutou, reported that the training was very useful to him as well as to the Municipal Advisors in his commune as the concepts of climate change and DRR were new to them. In the other Provinces, whilst we prioritised meetings with members of communal authorities / technical services who were trained, it proved very difficult to track down any of these people - and those few that we did manage to meet had only a hazy memory of the training.

Whilst analysis of communal plans was a core part of our proposed methodology, despite our repeated requests to partners, Christian Aid Burkina and local authorities in our meetings with them, we were only able to obtain three communal plans: the recent plans for Falangoutou in Seno and Tougo in Zondoma and the 2010 plan for Arbinda in Soum. This clearly limits the representativity of our findings on these plans.

Before discussing these findings, it is important to note that the difficulties that we encountered in meeting with authorities and obtaining plans tell us something useful in themselves. Were the project seen by authorities as a key partner, it is likely that we would have been able to obtain the majority of plans and speak to key officials; indeed we would

have expected partners to already have to hand (and to have commented on) draft versions of the plans. The difficulties in obtaining information and meetings suggest that the project was probably not seen by authorities as a key contributor.

Looking now at the plans themselves, in analysing the plans of Tougo and Falangoutou we considered the following questions:

- to what extent does a narrative about disaster risk reduction or resilience inform the choice of action?
- how do the recent plans compare with the previous generation of plans in the extent of their attention to DRR?
- to what extent do proposed actions align with village DRR action plans and with those in the informal communal DRR plans that were developed as part of project supported training workshops in Feb 2013?

The Tougo PCD gives some limited attention to DRR in that it mentions variability in rainfall and soil degradation in the background section; and includes the concept of environmental sustainability within its local economic development priority. However, there is no section dedicated to disaster risk management, vulnerability, resilience or any such related concept. The Falangoutou plan gives even less attention to these issues; discussion of climate-related risks and disaster risk management is virtually absent.

In comparing these plans with the 2010 Arbinda plan, it is difficult to identify any increased attention to DRR. Indeed the Falangoutou plan actually seems the weakest of the three in this regard as the pillar related to agro-pastoralism focuses on increased revenues and lacks the sustainability dimension of the others.

Training in Soum/Seno and Oudalan included the development of informal communal DRR plans. This is an interesting process and potentially a useful way to input to the PCD. However, whilst the Falangoutou plan includes a reference to this DRR communal action plan supported by ODE, it seems to have perceived as something separate to the communal plan, perhaps with its own source of financing. In reviewing the two plans side by side, it is difficult to see how the DRR communal plan has informed the PCD. Indeed the cost of the DRR communal plan seems unrealistic given the overall budget of the PCD.

Alongside this review of the plans, the consultancy team asked project partners, community leaders and local authorities about DRR-related influencing by project partners or community leaders in the course of development of the PCDs. ATAD reports meeting regularly with the authorities in Gorom-Gorom, drawing their attention to the importance of climate change and participating in meetings to discuss the communal plan (PCD). Similarly, the Mayor of Seytenga reports that ODE was invited to participate in work sessions with the Municipal Advisers. However, no-one could remember any specific suggestions made by project partners in the course of development of the plans, with respect to strengthening or improving their DRR focus. Indeed it seemed that no analysis had been carried out by the programme of the key weaknesses in the previous generation of PCDs or of the particular improvements that the programmes sought in the current round of plans.

We conclude from this that, whilst training and relationship building may have formed a good basis for future advocacy/influencing, no focused advocacy/influencing on DRR at communal level has yet taken place.

**Relating all this back to research hypothesis one, we conclude that the evidence suggests that the programme has fallen short of intended impacts in this area:**

- **On the positive side, important efforts were made at the outset of the project to support the participatory development of village level DRR action plans through Participatory and Vulnerability Assessments (PVCAs). These PVCAs were well documented and highly valued by many participants. On the other hand, the PVCAs did not fully achieve all their objectives and there is scope to further strengthen the methodology.**
- **A few community leaders clearly felt empowered by the existence of the DRR action plan and believed it had helped their advocacy efforts. However, evidence does not support the hypothesis that the DRR plans actually influenced in any substantial way support received from either the commune or other NGOs.**
- **Training and relationship building at communal level may have helped create the basis for future advocacy, but there is no evidence that focused DRR-related advocacy has yet taken place or that the project has had any influence on the content of recently developed PCDs.**

These findings are not entirely surprising given the level of ambition of the project, compared to its resources. Working across such a wide geographical area with limited resources and capacity has meant that (especially human) investment in many areas of the project has been insufficient to achieve the intended impacts. Geographical dispersion means that village-level work often does not provide a broad basis of experience for influencing at commune level. The proportion of villages in which the project is active varies between commune, but is always low. To give just a few examples, Arbinda has forty-three villages (BDRC worked in two), Tougo has twenty-three (BDRC worked in three) and Falangoutou thirteen (BDRC worked in one). The lack of critical mass in any one commune seems likely to limit the project's influence with communal authorities.

## **3.2 Hypothesis 2**

*Hypothesis 2: Project funding and community capacities support implementation of priority practical activities within the community action plan that directly benefit some individuals and their households. As a result, the resilience of these direct beneficiary households in the face of natural disasters is substantially increased. Women and men from all sections of the community benefit from these activities and the poorest and most vulnerable households in the community benefit at least proportionately to others.*

Given the complexity of this hypothesis, we consider it in three sub-sections. Firstly, we consider the final point, '*Women and men from all sections of the community benefit from these activities and the poorest and most vulnerable households in the community benefit at least proportionately to others*'. Then we consider the extent of benefits by looking at what the quantitative survey tells us about the direct results of activities. Finally, we assess the findings from the survey on overall changes in resilience for project beneficiaries (compared to non-beneficiaries).

### **3.2.1 Targeting**

It is important to note that the BDRC/PPA programme targets some of the poorest, and most vulnerable zones of Burkina Faso. This is particularly true of the Sahelian region, which is not only disaster prone, but chronically poor; almost 50% of the population of the Sahel is in the poorest quintile of the national population<sup>2</sup>. People in the Sahel are also vulnerable in the sense of having a particularly low stock of human capital; the Sahel has the worst indicators of all Provinces on almost all human development indicators, including chronic malnutrition, infant and child mortality and school enrolment<sup>3</sup>.

However, this does not mean that all households in the Sahel are equally vulnerable. The quantitative survey found a considerable diversity between households in terms of the proxy measures of vulnerability that it captured. The median household currently owns the equivalent of seventeen goats; but the 10% of the surveyed population with the fewest animals has the equivalent of two goats or less; whereas the 10% with the highest livestock holdings has the equivalent of sixty-seven goats or more (or six cows and seven goats, given relative prices). These differences are seen within zones and even within individual villages (even though livestock holdings are higher overall in Oudalan).

Thus, if resilience is understood to depend in part on the buffers of assets (material, financial, human and social assets), then, at least in the case of livestock, the buffers vary substantially between households, even between households in the same village. Livestock holdings, of course, are not a complete measure of resilience - other types of assets were not measured - but livestock holdings were repeatedly proposed by communities during the qualitative work as a key criterion for assessing household vulnerability. The conclusion that there is substantial diversity in vulnerability implies that targeting is not an irrelevance in this context.

The project aims also to ensure that the poorest and most vulnerable households in targeted communities benefit at least proportionately to others. We will examine the extent to which it achieves this by looking firstly at the criteria and processes used to select beneficiaries and then at targeting outcomes.

### **Beneficiary Selection Criteria and Processes**

In terms of process, a key finding is that village committees are given a large amount of discretionary power in the selection of beneficiaries. The training on DRR did cover

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<sup>2</sup> Burkina Institute of National Statistics and Demography, 2010. '*National Health and Demographic Survey*.'

<sup>3</sup> *ibid*

beneficiary selection and the importance of including the most vulnerable. Training participants from Gaik Goata, for example, remember being told to 'distribute fairly' and 'not to leave women out'.

Partners proposed some broad selection criteria to operationalise these principles, for example, they encouraged committees to prioritise widows with children and people with disabilities. They then left village committees (BDRC committees or special selection committees, depending on the zone) to refine these indicators; and to develop and operationalise a selection process.

Whilst descriptions of the selection process by committees indicated attention to fairness in the sense of ensuring that households from each quarter of the village were included, we identified a number of limitations of the targeting approach:

Firstly there are some issues with the targeting criteria:

- Not all community leaders can give a clear explanation of the criteria that they used in selection, and, even when clear, their criteria tend to be very broad. In all cases that we examined, the criteria seemed to describe far more households within the community than available project resources could possibly cover, giving committees substantial discretionary power in selection.
- Selection criteria for most activities include having the physical capacity to undertake the activity (e.g. to dig a compost pit or lay contour bunds or undertake gardening). In the case of some activities (e.g. women's economic activities and gardening), support was also limited to those already undertaking the activity. Such criteria would seem to militate against the selection of the most vulnerable within the community. In the case of livestock-rearing, some committees (e.g. in Kera Doure) report excluding some of the most vulnerable households due to their lack of required capacities.
- Whilst 'being vulnerable' often does seem to be a criterion, vulnerability is very vaguely defined and appears to require substantial subjective interpretation by committees. Unlike other organisations such as WFP and AMR, BDRC/PPA has not worked with communities to develop specific indicators of vulnerability.

We also had some concerns about the targeting process:

- The definition of a selection process has been left up to the community leadership (BDRC committee).
- From committee descriptions of the processes they actually used, there seems to have generally been very limited participation of community members (beyond the committee and quarter chiefs).
- Beneficiaries are generally even more unclear than committees about selection criteria, indicating a lack of transparency in selection, in contradiction to the principles of HAP.

- There is no process of verification of targeting outcomes by partners; the committee is simply trusted to select beneficiaries in line with project principles. Nor is there any active complaints mechanism that would enable problems to be flagged in case of error or abuse.

These issues mean that there is a substantial risk of elite capture of the benefits of the project. These risks are most likely to become a reality if the benefits on offer are of sufficiently high value to be of interest to the relatively better off. However, even in the context of low value benefits, there may be other dis-benefits of giving the village committee so much discretion in the context of limited transparency. For example, this may encourage patron-client type relationships, whereby members of the committee are seen as personally helping vulnerable households in return for other kinds of support.

### **Targeting Outcomes**

We also used data from the quantitative survey to analyse actual targeting outcomes. As proxies for vulnerability, we constructed the following indices:

- asset index five years ago: as a proxy for wealth status at project outset, we asked respondents to recall the number of different types of animal they owned five years ago and used this to construct an approximate animal index, based on local prices (a cow = 100, donkey = 20, sheep/goat = 10, chicken = 1). This index is likely, of course, to be subject to substantial recall errors and can only be considered as an approximation.
- dependency ratio: we calculated the ratio of the number of dependents (children and disabled/chronically ill adults) to the number of able-bodied adults in each household, because, in some contexts, this is a key marker of vulnerability.
- current membership of village committee: as a proxy for levels of education and local power/influence (which are unlikely to fluctuate as much as livestock holdings), we asked whether anyone in the household was currently a member of a village committee.
- status of head of household: we compared households currently headed by a woman versus a man; a widow versus a non-widow; an able-bodied person versus a person with a disability or chronic illness.

We found no significant correlation between any of these indicators and the likelihood that a household would be selected as a beneficiary into the programme. There is no evidence that those households with low/high livestock holdings are any more/less likely to benefit than each other. The same is true of female headed households versus male headed households, households with members on committees versus those without and those with a high proportion of dependents versus those composed mainly of able-bodied adults.

This is good news, in that it means there is no evidence that the most vulnerable households benefit less than others. On the other hand, the households that have relatively very high

livestock holdings, education and low dependency ratios are also just as likely as others to benefit. This means that value for money, according to the Christian Aid measure that takes into account the relative vulnerability of beneficiaries, is not as high as it would be if the project was targeting primarily the most vulnerable members of communities.

One more detailed point seems worth mentioning. Whilst overall female-headed households are equally likely as male-headed households to benefit from the programme, female-headed households are particularly unlikely to have benefited from contour bunds. The survey asked all households whether they had benefited from each BDRC/PPA activity in their village. Of the twenty nine female-headed households only two (7%), compared to 24% of male-headed households included in their household a beneficiary of this activity (see table 5 below). This is found to be a statistically significant under-representation.

Given that female-headed households are just as likely to be engaged in agriculture and just as vulnerable to soil erosion as male-headed households, the reasons for this gap could usefully be assessed and addressed. It is possible that the labour demands of the construction of the bunds pose a constraint to female-headed households; and if so there are various possible strategies to address this (e.g. a community work approach to the constructive of bunds on the fields of female-headed households could be one way).

**Table 5: Contour Bund Beneficiaries: Gender of Household Head**

		Beneficiary		Total
		yes	no	
Male-headed households	%	24%	76%	100%
Female-headed households	%	7%	93%	100%
Total	%	22%	78%	100%
	Count	69	244	313

We also note that in community meetings, women raised concerns about constraints to their construction of compost pits. In Kargono women said. 'If you don't have a young man in the household, you have to pay for labour to dig the pit'. Since this was not one of the focus activities in the quantitative study, we do not have data to show whether female-headed households have actually been disadvantaged in this activity under the project in a similar way to contour bunds. This would merit further analysis in future programme design.

In summary, we conclude that the assessment of targeting outcomes is broadly encouraging. The most vulnerable households benefit no less than others; and this has been achieved with low investment in oversight or verification of beneficiary selection by committees. On the other hand, beneficiary selection processes are at risk of elite capture and such capture may increase if higher levels of resourcing were available in future. It is proposed that some improvements to targeting would strengthen programme impacts on the most vulnerable.

Investments in targeting should, though, be proportionate to the overall resources: there would be limited value in a programme that invested more in targeting than direct support. If project resources continue at the current level, it is proposed that at a minimum basic checks and balances should be introduced (e.g. clarification and transparency of targeting criteria, review of a sample of selection decisions by project staff and ensuring access of the community to a complaints mechanism). If resources were to be substantially increased, a more robust participatory community targeting process could usefully be developed to manage the increased risks of elite capture.

### **3.2.2 Results of Project-Funded Activities**

The sections below detail the findings on the results for beneficiaries of support to practical disaster mitigation activities

Before turning to the findings of the quantitative survey, we highlight a few cross-cutting issues and just a few particularly striking findings of the qualitative study with respect to benefits of some of the activities not covered by the quantitative survey.

#### ***Cross-Cutting Issues***

The engagement of state de-concentrated technical services in the project is largely through provision of services to beneficiaries paid for by the project. For example, Government vets will visit project villages to vaccinate goats purchased through the project, if their fuel and per diems are paid by the project. Otherwise, villagers are required to transport their goats to the capital of the commune and pay a small fee for vaccination. Whilst there are clear benefits of ensuring that animals are vaccinated, paying for these services from Government providers raises issues of sustainability and equity, given that the project is aiming for a multiplication of benefits beyond direct beneficiaries. There is a risk that the project may be perpetuating a system of expectation of extra direct payment for services that arguably should be easily accessible at low cost to all (not only to direct project beneficiaries).

There is a similar issue with respect to training courses and workshops, where participants expect to be paid substantial per diems for participating.

These are established practices and it is not possible for CA to simply act alone to reject them: key people would not turn up for CA-funded training courses if it was the only organisation to pay no diems. However, the drawbacks of the current system are clear. The CA Burkina office is well aware of these challenges, but more may need to be done at senior level in collaboration with other large NGOs and other development actors to try to shift the system.

A second issue concerns the great variation in results of the project between villages. Partners are able to clearly identify villages where project progress has been strong, medium or weak. We visited several villages deemed 'weak'; in these villages it generally proved difficult to identify BDRC-related committees, let alone to obtain explanations of their responsibilities or activities.

Activity design and budgetary provision is nonetheless the same in all villages. This seems likely to prove inefficient. There seems little point in continuing to offer low level on-going support where interventions are clearly failing. The evaluation team suggests that in such villages a decision needs to be taken: either intensify support to overcome constraints, or recognise that constraints are insurmountable and re-allocate resources where they can be used more efficiently.

### ***Findings from the Qualitative Work***

We discussed project activities at length in many villages and used these findings to inform the quantitative survey design and data interpretation. In this short section, we simply highlight some particularly interesting findings on activities not covered by the survey.

Women reported that project grants in support of income-generating activities helped them in important ways. For example, in Kera Doure, one woman reported that cash transfers in support of income-generating activities resulted in increases of profits of up to 4,000 FCFA per month. This was because the 20,000 CFA transfer (10,000 of which is reimbursed after 6 months) eases cash flow constraints and avoids the need to buy inputs on credit at inflated prices. In Kargono women were equally enthusiastic about BDRC support to their income-generating activities; here the transfer had enabled them to increase the turnover of their activities - in one case from 5000 FCFA per month to 10,000 to 15,000FCFA - enabling the women to purchase school materials for their children. Also in Kargono, people reported as key benefits of the project: that training in production of animal feed had reduced the need to purchase this; and that training in the construction of improved stoves had reduced by 60% the amount of wood they needed to collect for cooking, 'Now we only need one cart of wood for the whole year'.

### ***Findings from the Quantitative Survey***

The quantitative survey covered the results of five focus activities: gardening, contour bunds, improved seeds, livestock raising and preparation of enriched porridge. These activities are tried and tested in Burkina; and it is important to bear in mind that many beneficiaries have previously benefited or are currently benefiting from support for the same activities from other NGOs.

As discussed in chapter two, some beneficiaries clearly find it difficult to distinguish BDRC/PPA from other projects. Large proportions of beneficiaries of some activities - 42% of beneficiaries of improved seeds and 53% of beneficiaries of animal rearing - report both that they were already conducting the activity five years ago and that the BDRC/PPA project (which as we know has been operating for less than five years) represented their first introduction to it. Such confusion means that we have to treat respondents' attribution of positive changes to BDRC/PPA with some caution and cannot know for sure whether key support to animal rearing and improved seeds came from BDRC or another project.

Beneficiaries of gardening do not exhibit this confusion between projects to anything like the same degree; and direct support to contour bunds was provided in the form of transport of a

measurable quantity of stones. This makes attribution of results more feasible for these two activities.

### Gardening

Of the sample of 32 gardening beneficiaries, all but one (97%) were already gardening five years ago and the vast majority (88% or 28 people) are still carrying out the activity.

93% of those beneficiaries currently gardening report an increase in the quantity of vegetables they produce compared to five years ago; 89% report an increase in the diversity of vegetables produced; and all report an increase in gardening profits over this same time period.

A small number of beneficiaries (four) demonstrate confusion between projects, stating that BDRC/PPA introduced them to gardening in the first place, even though they have been carrying out the activity since before the project started. These respondents were excluded from further analysis of important sources of support.

Of those beneficiaries who showed no evidence of confusion between projects and who are still gardening, 90% stated that the BDRC/PPA project has been the most important source of support to their gardening activities during the past five years.

### Contour Bunds

All forty-seven surveyed beneficiaries of training in contour bunds and/or transport of stones currently have contour bunds on their fields. The majority (87%) already used contour bunds five years ago, but most beneficiaries (83%) also report an increase in the area protected by contour bunds during the last five year period and 98% report that fields with contour bunds are more productive than those without.

Twenty beneficiaries are confused between projects and believe that BDRC/PPA introduced them to contour bunds, even though they already had them before the project started up, so this group was excluded from analysis of attribution of results.

78% of those beneficiaries who did not exhibit the above-mentioned confusion between projects reported that the BDRC/PPA project provided them with direct support (e.g. transport of stones) to protect their fields (rather than only training); this support on average enabled them to protect 1.6 hectares of land with contour bunds.

### Improved Seeds

Of the sixty-nine surveyed beneficiaries of improved seeds, all but one report that they used improved seeds in the current year. Of the forty-one beneficiaries who had used improved seeds in a previous drought year, 95% reported increased yields compared to non-improved seeds (and 5% reported decreased yields).

On the other hand, the shift to the use of improved seeds has not occurred entirely within the lifetime of the BDRC/PPA project; 77% of beneficiaries reported that they were already using improved seeds five years ago.

### Animal-Rearing

All thirty-five surveyed beneficiaries of goat/sheep rearing are currently engaged in this activity, up from 89% (31 people) who were already rearing livestock five years ago.

Beneficiaries were asked to select up to three key benefits of animal rearing for the household. The most oft cited benefits are the use of the income generated to pay for healthcare and to buy food (see table 6 below).

<b>Table 6: Benefits of Animal Rearing</b>		<b>No of responses</b>	<b>% of Respondents Citing</b>
1. Household drinks milk		4	11%
2. <b>I buy food and we eat better</b>		17	<b>49%</b>
3. Eat meat ourselves		3	9%
4. Can contribute to school fees myself		12	34%
5. <b>I pay for healthcare</b>		19	<b>54%</b>
6. I use the income to invest in other economic activities		5	14%
7. I am able to contribute to marriages and other social expenses		13	37%
<b>Total</b>		73	

57% of beneficiaries report an increase in the number of sheep/goats they own compared to five years ago, whereas 40% report a reduction. Over the past five years, the average (median) beneficiary, sold five animals, consumed two animals and lost three through theft or death. They also increased their livestock holdings by the equivalent of four to five goats, which is slightly more than the median non-beneficiary household (who gained less than one goat).


Whilst at first sight these findings seem to suggest modest positive benefits from livestock rearing for BDRC/PPA beneficiaries, it is not actually the case that livestock-rearing beneficiaries as a whole have seen a statistically significant greater increase in livestock holdings than non-beneficiary households over the past five years. There is actually a very high level of variation both within the group of beneficiary households and within the group of non-beneficiary households (ranging between a loss of the equivalent of 390 goats to a gain of 250 goats) which outweighs any small apparent differences between the two groups. Furthermore the attempt to attribute effects subjectively by asking respondents themselves about the most important source of support to their livestock rearing also failed due to the confusion between projects exhibited by the majority of beneficiaries of this activity.

## Enriched porridge

We examined a sample of thirty-seven women listed as direct beneficiaries of training in the preparation of enriched porridge and who currently have children aged 6-24 months. We find that 14% of the sample (five women) did not prepare enriched porridge five years ago and currently prepare it every day for their children. Whilst it is possible that they would have learned the preparation technique from others within the village with or without the project, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the project has contributed to an important behaviour change for these women to the benefit of their children. Given the random selection of the sample, we would expect to see a similar impact for approximately 14% of all beneficiaries with small children.

The twenty-four beneficiaries who either do not currently prepare enriched porridge or who prepare it infrequently, were asked to give the single most important reason that they did not prepare it every day. Half stated that the required ingredients were not available and a further third said that these ingredients were too expensive (see figure 1 and table 7 below).

In other words, 54% of all surveyed beneficiaries of this activity (20 women of a total of 37) reported that they do not regularly prepare enriched porridge due to lack of availability or cost of ingredients. This ties in with the findings of qualitative research; women in the villages of Bidi and Boulel told us that they did not manage to prepare enriched porridge regularly for these same reasons. Lack of affordable access to the promoted ingredients appears to be more of a problem than lack of knowledge of preparation techniques, whereas project support has been focused on training.



<b>Table 7</b>	No of responses	%
1. Ingredients not available	12	50%
2. Ingredients too expensive	8	33%
3. I don't know how to prepare it	1	4%
4. I don't have the time	2	8%
5. The children refuse to eat it	1	4%
Total	24	100%

So a re-think about project support seems called for. If the recipes promoted are ill-adapted to the availability of ingredients in the particular areas of Burkina in which the project is operational, in the future the project might consider one of two approaches: either working in partnership with specialists in nutrition and local plants/tree products to promote recipes that use ingredients that are truly local and affordable in project zones; or, if this proves impossible, doing more to promote access of mothers of young children to income-generating opportunities that enable them to pay for ingredients.

### **Summary of Results**

The evidence strongly suggests that there are positive results of all activities for some beneficiaries. Furthermore the outputs of these activities are likely to bolster household assets in ways that could contribute to disaster resilience. Some activities are contributing to increased agricultural yields or to higher off-farm incomes, which will enhance households' financial assets; some are increasing natural resource or livestock assets; many are increasing knowledge and skills, thereby building human capital.

As a caveat, it is important to note that most beneficiaries were already carrying out the activity prior to the support they received from the BDRC project; the project has enabled them to extend the scale and/or effectiveness of their existing disaster mitigation activities. This does not negate the positive results for direct beneficiaries. But, if knowledge and use of these techniques is already widespread, the scope for substantial multiplication to others in the project zones will be more limited than if the project were introducing innovations.


### **3.2.3 Overall Impacts on Resilience**

We found no statistically significant difference between project beneficiary and non-beneficiary households in the change in household livestock holdings over the past five years.

This was the only objective proxy indicator of resilience that we were able to measure given available data. However, respondents were also asked in the survey whether they felt the capacity of their household to cope with risks had increased, decreased or stayed the same over the past five years.

Overall 65% felt their coping capacity had improved (26% a lot and 39% a little), 20% that it had stayed the same and 15% that it had deteriorated.

**Figure 2: If you compare the situation of your household today with that of five years ago, do you think your capacity to cope with a (climate-related) threat has increased or decreased during that period?**



Further analysis demonstrated a clear correlation between perception of household resilience in the face of a risk and the number of BDRC/PPA activities from which the household had benefitted. As can be seen in table 8 below, only 43% of households that had not benefitted directly from any BDRC/PPA reported an increase in resilience compared to 63% of household that benefitted from one BDRC/PPA activity and 78% of households that benefitted from two or more activities.

Similarly 22% of households not benefiting from a BDRC/PPA activity reported deterioration in resilience, compared to only 16% of those benefiting from one BDRC/PPA activity and 12% of those benefiting from two or more such activities. This correlation holds for all three of the programme zones when the data is disaggregated and for all definitions of beneficiary/non beneficiary (see chapter two). It is statistically significant at a 95% confidence level (indeed there is less than a 1:1000 chance of these discrepancies occurring by chance).

**Table 8: Change in Resilience and BDRC/ PPA Activities**

		change in resilience			Total
		improvement	no change	deterioration	
number of	none	43%	35%	22%	100%
BDRC/PPA	1	63%	21%	16%	100%
activities	2 or more	78%	10%	12%	100%
Total		64%	20%	16%	100%

On the other hand, the correlation does not prove that the BDRC/PPA programme caused the impact. Although we could not find a correlation with any obvious variable we had measured (e.g. zone or initial livestock index), selection of programme beneficiaries was non-random and it is not impossible that the programme selected as beneficiaries those

households that were on an upward trajectory for other reasons. Also the measure is a subjective one: households' reported perception of the change in their resilience. It is not impossible that those who had benefited most from the programme were more likely to report a positive change in their resilience for other reasons, for example in order to please the programme evaluators.

That said, when taken together with the positive findings on the results of individual activities, the correlation tends to support the hypothesis that the project is delivering resilience-related benefits for direct beneficiaries.

The following section examines the mechanism through which the project may be delivering a resilience effect. It is interesting to note that project impact on resilience is not operating through an impact on the change in the numbers of animals. Whilst there is a significant correlation between reported change in resilience and change in livestock holdings of the household over the past five years, as we saw above there is no significant correlation between being a programme beneficiary (of animal-rearing or other project activities) and an increase in household livestock holdings.

Those reporting an increase in resilience over the past five years were asked to cite up to three key causes of this change. There was some variation across zones, but the key causes mentioned across all three zones were: implementation of new drought resistant production techniques (mentioned by 60% of respondents); and increased knowledge of strategies to cope with disasters (mentioned by 44% of respondents) (see table 9). Given that these have been areas of focus of the BDRC/PPA programme this lends further weight to the suggestion of programme impact on household resilience through the mechanism of support to agricultural strategies for managing drought.

Indeed, further analysis shows that, in addition to the correlation with the number of BDRC/PPA activities from which the household is benefiting mentioned above, being a beneficiary specifically of one of the BDRC/PPA activities focused on agricultural drought mitigation (contour bunds, improved seeds or gardening) is significantly positively correlated with reporting an improvement in household resilience.

	<b>Table 9: Causes of Increase in Resilience in face of Climate-Related Risks</b>							
	1 incr hhold work capacity	2 incr remittances	3 fewer dependents	4 incr knowledge of risk management strategies	5 new drought resistant production techniques	6 more animals	7 income- generating activities	8 support from a project
Oudalan	15%	13%	4%	<b>47%</b>	<b>79%</b>	26%	11%	<b>72%</b>
Soum/Seno	<b>40%</b>	4%	6%	<b>42%</b>	<b>56%</b>	22%	27%	22%
North	14%	19%	1%	<b>43%</b>	<b>44%</b>	<b>49%</b>	36%	9%
% of Total	21%	12%	4%	<b>44%</b>	<b>60%</b>	33%	24%	36%

Finally, it is interesting also to consider the case of respondents who replied that their capacity to deal with climate related risks had decreased over the past five years. These

people were similarly asked to list up to three key causes of this reduction. The results are shown in table 10 below and it can be seen the death/illness of a breadwinner in the household is the most often cited cause (cited by 69% of these respondents), ahead even of soil erosion. This illustrates the important interactions between climate-related and other risks; and suggests that the programme might usefully be designed in future to support mitigation of and recovery from household-level shocks, as well climate-related ones.

Table 10: Causes of Reduction of Resilience in face of Climate-Related Risks							
1 death/ illness of a breadwinner	2 decrease in remittances	3 increase in no of children	4 land degradation	5 climatic shocks	6 death of animals	7 locust attacks	8 food price increases
69%	8%	35%	45%	41%	39%	2%	25%

Relating all this back to research hypothesis 2, we conclude that the evidence supports the hypothesis: project funding and community capacities have supported implementation of priority practical activities, which have delivered real benefits to individuals and their households. There is no evidence to suggest that the most vulnerable households are any less likely to have benefited from project activities than other households. Most beneficiary households believe that their capacity to cope with climate-related threats has increased over the past five years; and they are more likely to believe this than non-beneficiary households.

### **3.3 Hypothesis 3**

*Hypothesis 3: There is a multiplication effect. Direct beneficiaries train or act as demonstrators for others in their village; the project provides some equipment for the community as a whole; and the PVCA process raises awareness of how some key vulnerabilities can be addressed through capacities/resources already available within the community. As a result, there is an increase in uptake of priority DRR activities and benefits reach beyond the households directly supported by the project. Substantial numbers of households benefit indirectly in this way and the poorest and most vulnerable households benefit at least proportionately. Given the numbers reached directly and indirectly, project investments are cost efficient.*

For methodological reasons this is the most challenging hypothesis to address and the evidence is more limited than for other hypotheses.

The quantitative survey suggests some scope for a multiplication effect: 15% of direct beneficiaries report that it was a neighbour, family member or friend who first introduced them to a disaster mitigation activity. We cannot conclude, though, that these people benefited from a multiplication of the BDRC project. As mentioned above, in most villages BDRC is not the first or only project to support disaster mitigation. Thus if people have adopted new techniques as a result of copying neighbours or relatives, it is extremely difficult to decide to which project intervention this effect can be attributed.

Some positive examples of multiplication effects of BDRC were given during the qualitative study. For example, in Gaik-Goata meeting participants reported that substantial numbers of women had benefited indirectly from BDRC training on improved stoves, due to informal skills transfer from the women trained to other women in their quarter. Furthermore, the women trained in making the stoves reported that, whilst it was generally expected that women wanting an improved stove would seek the required clay themselves (or pay themselves for its collection), they would collect the clay for women who were physically and financially incapable of so doing. One woman reported that she had helped four vulnerable women in her quarter in this way. In the same village men reported that neighbours came to watch those who had been trained in contour bunds and later replicated the technique themselves. Two men present in the meeting confirmed that they had learned about contour bunds in this way and had gone on to make contour bunds on their own land.

We suggest that such replication is most likely to occur where the key constraint to uptake of the activity is understanding/knowledge. Overall the potential for further multiplication effects will be limited by the fact that these activities are not generally new to communities and that knowledge and use is already widespread. On the other hand, there is likely to be variation between activities, villages and even households.

For example, in the village of Gaik-Goata both clay and stones were locally available and the main constraint for most people was lack of knowledge of the techniques. Other villages are located at far greater distances from sources of stones and clay and it cannot be assumed that replication would occur so easily in such villages. Also, even where stones/clay are located nearby some particularly vulnerable people may face constraints to access them;

and multiplication to these people may depend on the adoption of special mechanisms (as adopted by the community of Gaik-Goata). Analysis of such issues or support to the development of mechanisms to maximise multiplication has not been systematic in the project.

**In sum, in respect of hypothesis three we can say that the limited available evidence indicates that some multiplication of benefits has taken place. More systematic analysis of the constraints to uptake of activities faced in various villages and by different households might help further promote multiplication going forward.**

### **3.4 Hypothesis 4**

*Hypothesis 4: Village level early warning (EW) committees play an important role in facilitating communication of early warning information between communities and local authorities, in both directions. As a result of their actions, if and when there is a serious threat, earlier action is taken and disaster losses are reduced.*

In the strongest villages, for example Kargono and Gaik-Goata there are active early warning committees in place set up by BDRC. These committees understand that their role is to communicate early warning information between the community and the local authorities and they are active within the limits of their knowledge and authority. For example in Gaik-Goata the committee has a notebook in which it records information on rainfall patterns and reports using this information in order to purchase cereals before prices rise. Even in villages where committees are deemed weak and few other activities are succeeding anti-locust committees are active and spray villagers' fields in years when locusts are a particular problem. This is the case for example in Boulel.

However, no examples of a practical early-warning related impact of the actions of these committees could be found. For example, in Kargono the EW committee initially claimed to have played a key role in the alert of a cholera epidemic and in the taking of measures to protect the village. But on closer inspection it became clear that action had been led by the local authorities and that the committee's sole action had been to contact the local health officer to check whether reports were or were not correct.

In Gaik-Goata, whilst the committee is collecting rainfall data, the local technical services are not interested in this data as they have their own sources of meteorological data; neither is the data collected by the committee being regularly shared with the community - there have been no meetings to discuss this data during 2013. The committees currently have no connection to the existing early warning system (EWS). Part of the problem is that they have no formal recognition within the national EWS, which means that they have no authority to approach the local technical services.

**Despite the evident enthusiasm of the members of some of the early warning committees, the project has not enabled them to define their roles and to create the connections that would enable them to add real value as part of the national early warning system. As such, we conclude that the intended impact with respect to**

**hypothesis four has not yet been achieved, even though some useful building blocks are in place. High quality action research on how to connect the project with the national EWS was carried out as part of the project in 2010 and we recommend that Christian Aid and partners re-visit its recommendations.**

### **3.5 Hypothesis 5**

*Hypothesis 5: As a result of HAP training, community leaders, all community members, project partners and local authorities understand the principles of downward accountability. Community level mechanisms are established/ modified to improve accountability: community leaders and members (including all sub-groups within the population): have access to relevant information in appropriate formats; participate meaningfully and exercise influence at all stages of the project cycle; and know how and where to complain about the actions of project stakeholders (community members, community communities, partners and CA etc.). These mechanisms are actively used and effectively managed. As a result of the project's introduction of HAP, accountability principles may even start to be applied by communities and local authorities in other contexts, beyond the project.*

Given the complexity of this research hypothesis, we have split the analysis into the following sub-sections: understanding of HAP principles; access to information; participation; complaints mechanisms.

#### **3.5.1 Understanding of HAP Principles**

One aim of the project was to develop an understanding of HAP principles on the part of project partner staff, community committees, the wider community and other stakeholders. From our many meetings during the qualitative study, we reached the following conclusions.

Project partner key technical staff understand the HAP principles, though some say that they have only really consolidated their understanding thanks to the recent training (Nov 2013). Local authorities have some understanding of the principles, though tend to emphasise information sharing, rather than participation or complaints mechanisms.

Understanding by community leadership is variable. In Masbore the whole community leadership understands well. In Kera Doure and Gaik Goata the village chiefs (who in both cases is also President of BDRC) display a good understanding of the HAP principles, but in Kera Doure no-one else shares this understanding :

'Everyone should have access to the same level of information and everyone should be involved' (chief Gaik Goata)

'If we see something is not right we should say so' (chief Kera Doure),

However, in the majority of villages the understanding is very partial even amongst those community leaders recently trained in HAP; and in Boulel and Tougo no-one has any understanding of HAP. As for the wider community, we found that they rarely had any

understanding of HAP and in most villages those trained have not trained others in their village.

Even in villages where people can recite some of the principles of HAP, there is serious misunderstanding of what this means in terms of practical action.

For example, in Kargono two examples were given to the head of the HAP committee: 1. a case of an extremely vulnerable person, more vulnerable than selected beneficiaries, who complained to him about being excluded from project activities; and 2. the case of the number of goats allocated to the village being less than they had been told by project staff to expect. In both cases the HAP committee leader said that he would not raise the issue with project staff or others. Rather he would tell those left out to 'be patient and wait till next time', because 'the project is a gift'.

Similarly, when faced with scenario 1, committee members in Kera Doure reported that, 'we would persuade the person not to be discouraged' because, 'this is not a real complaint and just requires awareness-raising'.

These responses give some indication of the extent to which a HAP style accountability mechanism is challenging to implement in this context. This is seen even in the responses given by project partners. One project partner staff member stated that even if he had concerns about CA he would not complain because 'the hand that gives is higher than the hand that receives'.

### **3.5.2 Access to Information**

We assessed access to information through both qualitative and quantitative methods.

In terms of knowledge of the project budget, the quantitative survey found that (with the exception of inhabitants of Bidi village<sup>4</sup>) only 1% of respondents knew the project budget for their village. This supports the finding of the qualitative study that in most villages even the committees had no idea of the budget for their village or for the project as a whole. Some committee Presidents, for example the President in Kera Doure, reported that they had been told the global budget for all villages, but had forgotten it.

As for understanding of project objectives, we found through the qualitative work that in one village, Masbore, community leaders gave a clear and correct explanation of the project objectives. In most other villages, this understanding was more general and not specifically linked to DRR. Most thought the project had to do with supporting village development or reducing poverty/hunger. In Kera Doure the key objective was seen as, 'improving well-being'; in Kargono it was, 'helping people to have something' ; and in Korizena, 'to help the village develop'.

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<sup>4</sup> 11 of 13 respondents from Bidi gave identical responses of 4,0875,000 for their village budget. The evaluators are somewhat suspicious of this finding and think it likely to represent an error on the form. Even if there has recently been a village meeting to discuss the budget, it seems highly unlikely that all these respondents would recall the budget correctly to five significant figures.

We also found that in most villages both the project committee and the direct beneficiaries could cite some of the project activities, but that there was a high and unanticipated degree of confusion between BDRC and other projects. This was also very clear from some of the contradictory answers given in the quantitative study (see chapter two and section 3.22).

### **3.5.3 Participation**

Participation in the design of project activities is discussed under research hypothesis one above and participation in selection of beneficiaries is discussed under research hypothesis two. To avoid duplication, we focus here on participation issues related to the decision-making power of village committees.

Firstly it is important to highlight the large amount of decision-making power in the hands of the village BDRC committees (or beneficiary selection committees in some zones). This can be seen as a positive element - the committees seem to feel a real sense of ownership - but it also presents a challenge in ensuring that the wider community is able to participate meaningfully in decision-making and to hold the committee to account.

This challenge is exacerbated by the composition of the committees. The process of selection of HAP committees (or BDRC committees where this is the one that leads on HAP as in the North) is somewhat unclear. A community meeting is called and the committee is selected by common agreement. There are no particular criteria for selection. In practice BDRC and HAP committees are composed mainly of members of the intellectual elite of the village and the same people are often represented on several leadership structures within the village.

In the quantitative survey, we find that BDRC committee members tend to come from households represented on other village committees. Of those respondents who have a household member on the BDRC committee, 77% also have a household member on another village committee; only 21% of households who do not have a household member on the BDRC committee are represented on other committees. This is a statistically significant correlation<sup>5</sup>.

Women are present on all committees, but are always fewer than men and there are no women Presidents. This is not surprising in the context, indeed is almost inevitable, but again underlines the challenge of concentrating decision-making power in the hands of the committee and the need to support wider participation.

### **3.5.4 Complaints Mechanisms**

In this section, in line with research hypothesis five, we consider two levels of complaints mechanism: i) a mechanism that enables community leaders to complain about the project, including about project partners or Christian Aid Burkina; ii) a mechanism that enables all

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<sup>5</sup> at the 95% confidence level. The statistic is 0.000 i.e. there is less than a 1/1000 chance of this outcome occurring by chance if there was no real correlation.

members of the community to complain about the project, including about the village project committee.

### **Mechanism for Community Leaders**

One village, Masbore, has a clear complaints mechanism understood by committee members that covers both external complaints (about the project/project staff) and internal complaints (about the BDRC committee). This exists in written form, and includes contacts in CA Burkina and even CA London. Given that the listed contact person for CA Burkina left a year ago, we argue, however, that even in this village the system cannot be considered to be fully operational.

In all other villages the complaints system is much more partial. Some committee members in some villages have a phone number of someone in the partner project team (but many do not) and few have any contact details for Christian Aid. Korizena is fairly typical. The committee used to have the phone number of an ATAD staff member, but no longer has it and does not have the contact details of anyone in Christian Aid.

All communities reported that they had never made a complaint about the project, whilst project partners reported receiving many complaints by phone, mainly from male village leaders/committee members. We can only hypothesise about the discrepancy between the perception of committees and partners, but it may be that community leaders see these phone calls as on-going communication, rather than 'complaints'. Committee members certainly mentioned phoning project partners to discuss project management issues.

In any case, partners have kept no records of the complaints they have received - who complained, the nature of the complaint or how it was handled - so there is no way for the evaluation team to further investigate this issue. More importantly the lack of documentation also means that there is no way for project managers to ensure that complaints are resolved and no possibility of using data on common complaints to improve overall project performance.

We conclude that active complaints systems are not currently operating in project villages. There are encouraging signs of increasingly open communication between village committees and project staff, which could form a useful basis for the development of complaints systems in future. However, these changes cannot be attributed to the project; similar shifts in communication were reported by other NGOs and by Government officials and seem to be due mainly to wider political shifts in the past two years.

### **Access to complaints mechanism by all community members**

Even in villages where the committee has a relatively good understanding of the complaints mechanism, this understanding does not extend beyond the committee to the wider population. We looked specifically at the data for the villages that according to the qualitative analysis had made strongest progress on HAP: Masbore, Gaik-Goata and Kera Doure. We found that none of the respondents in Gaik-Goata or Kera Doure had a full and correct understanding of the complaints mechanism. Even in Masbore where 6 individuals (40% of the sample) could cite the principles of HAP and said they knew the complaints

system, only 1 person (7% of the sample) knew who to contact if they actually had a complaint.

The quantitative survey also found that approximately 4% of the sample across all villages (13 people) had had a serious concern about the project, but that none of these 13 people had raised the concern. The main reasons for non-reporting were: not knowing to whom to report the concern (5 people); being scared of the repercussions on themselves of reporting it (4 people); and feeling that they did not have the right to complain (3 people).

Thus whilst there are at least increasing informal channels that enable village committees to raise concerns, there does not seem to be any established way for other members of the community to do so. Given that many key decisions are in the hands of the committee (including beneficiary selection and management of project funds), it is of concern that there is no mechanism to enable the wider community to hold this committee to account.

This may be an issue not simply with implementation, but rather with the understanding of HAP within the project. According to partners, only key community leaders have the right to raise sensitive complaints, not the general population. If complaints are ever received from other people they are, apparently, referred back to the village committee.

One further issue of relevance only in Oudalan is the support provided under the project to commune level committees (CSBs). These committees were developed as part of a national civil society initiative and their role was to promote good governance within the commune and accountability of local authorities to citizens. They offered a real potential to link the work of the HAP committees into broader local governance work; and to extend the use of existing advocacy approaches and tools to address DRR issues. Unfortunately, however, this potential was not realised and no links were made. CSBs were not aware of HAP committees and vice versa. CSBs, whilst paid for from BDRC budget, worked mainly on different sectoral issues, especially health and education, but even where there was a common interest with the BDRC programme e.g. on hygiene and sanitation, no practical linkages were established between the BDRC committees and the CSBs. The CSBs are no longer being funded under the PPA.

**In relation to research hypothesis five, we conclude that whilst HAP training activities have been carried out as planned, there is no evidence that this has led to the practical application of HAP principles. Community leaders and members do not in general have access to relevant information in appropriate formats and do not know how and where to complain about the actions of project stakeholders. Complaints mechanisms are not actively used and effectively managed. The overall story on participation, is somewhat more positive, but is addressed elsewhere in the report, so is not duplicated here.**

One reason for the failure to achieve the intended impact in relation to complaints mechanisms is probably that the design of this component failed to take account of the challenge of setting up such a system in Burkina context. Had people been used to accountability/complaints mechanisms and had this way of working already been embedded in the local culture, it may have been sufficient to send community leaders on a training

course and leave them to set up village mechanisms. But such familiarity with complaints mechanisms does not yet exist; and in reality setting up such a system is likely to require a substantial level of awareness-raising, support to development of practical tools and on-going support in implementation.

### **3.6 Hypothesis 6**

*Hypothesis 6: Christian Aid adds value to the project as a partner. Partnership principles and expectations are clearly set out and agreed by all. Partners feel that training, mentoring, analysis and on-going support and feedback provided by Christian Aid has led to improvements in their BDRC/PPA programming practice in Burkina and can identify specific examples of this. This added value of Christian Aid represents good value for money.*

Project partners recognise the added value of the training provided by Christian Aid on PVCA, DRR, advocacy and HAP to themselves, local authorities and community leaders. These training workshops addressed key issues and, had the learning from these courses been fully put into practice, the extent of innovation and policy influence of the programme might have been substantially increased. We were also impressed by the quality of the action research on early warning systems carried out in 2010 and again feel that implementation of the recommendations could have added real value to the programme.

On the other hand, some shortcomings in partnership working were noted.

Christian Aid's contribution to DRR and HAP has focused strongly on the funding and organisation of training courses. Training courses are, in the view of the consultancy team, a necessary but not sufficient contribution to innovation. For example, as discussed in section 3.5 above, the evaluation team believes that successfully embedding HAP principles will require the participatory development of practical tools for implementation and on-going support in implementation.

Also Christian Aid should be well placed to support partners in their advocacy efforts at local level and to identify emerging issues that are outside the responsibility of local authorities and can best be addressed through advocacy at national policy level. However, there is no evidence of Christian Aid playing this kind of supportive role in programme advocacy. Whilst training on advocacy was carried out for partners, this has been insufficient to result in a realistic or well-focused advocacy plan. The draft plan developed by Burkina partners during the training does not identify clear advocacy messages or realistic entry points. Even where high quality action research has been carried out, for example on Early Warning Systems, the recommendations of this research appear to have had little influence on programming.

Apart from the funding contract there is no document that sets out partnership principles and expectations of Christian Aid Burkina and its BDRC partners: ODE, ATAD and Reseau Marp. It is recommended that such a document be drawn up on the basis of a discussion between Christian Aid and its partners of the roles, responsibilities and expected behaviours

of each partner. Such a process would be a useful entry point to address some of the current challenges highlighted in this section. (See recommendation twenty-five).

Although partners have implemented slightly different approaches under BDRC/PPA (for example institutional arrangements at village level have been different) there has been little cross-learning. Christian Aid could have usefully facilitated learning workshops between partners.

There has also been a lack of shared understanding between CA and partners over available funding. Partners report shock at budget reductions, whereas CA reports that annual budgets were known by all well in advance. This suggests a communication issue. Furthermore, the perception of partners is that decisions are coming down from CA London and that they are unable to question them. Partners are often unclear on the rationale for prioritisation decisions with respect to CA funding of practical disaster mitigation activities and struggle to explain them to communities. Importantly, partners report that had they known available funding and had they felt they had a choice they would have taken different prioritisation decisions than those actually taken, for example they would have concentrated programming in fewer villages.

Partners report that delays in finalising funding agreements and in the annual transfer of funds have resulted in uncertainty and difficulties for them in retaining staff. High staff turnover has led to loss of understanding of key project concept and gaps in field activities, such that community work has not been at all continuous during the lifetime of BDRC/PPA.

Partners also report that there is insufficient budgetary provision for their own supervision of and support to field staff and that sometimes they have to cover these costs from other budgets. They find that CA Burkina staff sometimes involve themselves inappropriately in project implementation, visiting villages themselves to carry out awareness-raising work directly with communities. They would prefer CA to provide them with sufficient resources to carry out such work themselves.

**There is thus some sense of partnerships under strain and evident scope to strengthen the value-added of Christian Aid in future. On a positive note, relationships seem strong, creating a basis for addressing these issues. In the wrap-up meeting when these issues were aired there was evidence of real openness on all sides to discuss and address them, with a view to strengthening the partnerships. This bodes well for the future of DRR programming in Burkina. A set of specific recommendations to deepen understanding and start to address the identified issues is set out in chapter four below.**

## **CHAPTER FOUR: IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **4.1 Summary of Findings**

We conclude that the **evidence supports research hypothesis two**.

Through CA funding of some of the activities included in the action plans of the nineteen project villages, the project has brought real benefits for individuals and their households. The supported activities are tried and tested approaches in Burkina and most households were already carrying out the activities for which they have received support, prior to the start-up of the project. The project has brought incremental improvements in the uptake and effectiveness of these existing activities.

There is no evidence to suggest that the most vulnerable households are any less likely overall to have benefited from these activities than other households (although they are also no more likely than other households to have benefited). There is scope to strengthen the targeting process and to make it more transparent; and this would be particularly important if the scale of investments were to increase.

Participation was very strong in the early stages of the development of village DRR action plans and local partners have a strong existing knowledge of the zone; as a result, activities have generally been appropriate to the risk profile of the village. However, participation waned in later stages of the project cycle and this has affected both the involvement of community members in decision making and, in some cases, the appropriateness of the detailed design of activities.

It is important to note that most households were already carrying out the activities for which they have received support, prior to the start-up of the project. Thus the project can more plausibly be seen as having somewhat increased the scale and effectiveness of existing disaster-mitigation activities, rather than having had a transformative effect by introducing innovations.

**Available evidence partially supports hypothesis three.** There has been some multiplication, with non-beneficiaries being introduced to activities by beneficiaries to some extent, especially in the case of improved stoves. However, evidence in this area is quite limited.

**The evidence does not support the other research hypotheses.**

- Despite the training provided to local authorities and other key stakeholders, there is no evidence that the programme has influenced other actors to give increased / more appropriate support to disaster risk reduction (*hypothesis one*).
- Whilst early warning committees have been set up and some are active, they are insufficiently connected with the national early warning system to have had the intended impacts (*hypothesis four*).
- Despite some strengths in participation, the HAP principles of access to information and to complaints mechanisms have not been realised in practice, despite efforts in these areas (*hypothesis five*).

- The value added of Christian Aid has been limited in important ways; and there is certainly scope to improve this going forward (*hypothesis six*).

In terms of progress towards the project goal, there is some evidence that the project has contributed to reducing vulnerability to future shocks and crises. Whilst the change in livestock holdings of beneficiary households over the past five years (the only proxy measure of resilience that we were able to assess with the limited available data) is not significantly different from that of non-beneficiary households, most beneficiary households do believe that their capacity to cope with climate-related threats has increased. Comparing beneficiary and non-beneficiary households in project villages, **beneficiary households are significantly <sup>6</sup> more likely than non-beneficiary households to perceive an improvement in their resilience over the past five years.**

Relating the findings back to the programme theory of change, we conclude that:

The programme outputs (the intended outputs of the six hypotheses) should have been sufficient to achieve the overall programme objective and that the higher level programme theory of change has been valid in theory in the context. To the extent that some intended results have not been achieved, the key problems appear to have been a disconnect between intended **outputs** on the one hand and **activities** and **inputs** on the other.

Firstly, the inputs (resources) have probably been insufficient to achieve the outputs. The whole Burkina BDRC had a budget of only £750k over five years, whereas the outputs envisaged quite substantial results and impacts across three provinces and ten communes.

Secondly, the design of activities has sometimes been inappropriate to achieve the outputs.

- Programming has been insufficiently informed by an understanding of the specific strengths and weaknesses of the current national system for addressing DRR and building disaster resilience and of where CA can add most value. For example, the focus on increasing attention to DRR in the new communal plans has not been informed by an analysis of the DRR strengths and weaknesses of the previous plans; and, whilst interesting action research was carried out under BDRC into how to link communities into the national early warning system, its useful recommendations have not really informed programming.
- Whilst the attempts to introduce innovations such as DRR mainstreaming and on building downward accountability (through HAP) are valid and important, there has probably been too much focus on formal training, at the expense of support in the development of practical tools and on-going support to implementation.
- Excessive geographical spread of the programme has dissipated whatever impacts may have been realisable had resources been concentrated in a more limited geographical area. The programme has had insufficient critical mass to have much

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<sup>6</sup> This is a statistically significant result at the 95% confidence level.

influence in any particular commune; and large distances between villages have increased time and costs of travel.

These weaknesses in detailed project design activities mean that the limited available resources have probably not been used to maximum effectiveness in achieving outputs.

## **4.2 Implications**

The evaluators conclude that a strategic re-think of future programming directions is required in order to maximise the impact of Christian Aid supported DRR/resilience programming in Burkina. The current study was an evaluation, not a future programme design mission, and the evaluators do not have all the information they would require to make detailed recommendations on new programme directions. However, in this section we attempt to be as helpful as possible by proposing a process by which key programming questions could be addressed and by giving specific ideas where this seems appropriate.

As set out above, part of the problem to date seems to have been a disconnect between the level of ambition and the scale of resourcing; and it follows that the detailed design of future programming will depend to some extent on the available resources (human and financial).

### What changes does the programme want to bring about?

It is critical that there is a clear and shared understanding by project partners and CA of the specific changes in policy and practice that the project is trying to bring about. 'More attention to DRR' is insufficiently specific. There is already a DRR policy framework and system in place in Burkina and CA and we suggest that critical next steps should be to:

- assess specific gaps/weaknesses in current policy and practice
- identify entry points for influence and opportunities for CA to add value
- use this analysis to clarify the overall and specific objectives of the programme.

These objectives should then form the basis not only of the design of advocacy activities, but indeed of the whole programme. Practical programming can serve to test innovative approaches, the results of which can form the basis of advocacy. Currently, the programme is making a contribution to increasing the scale of existing disaster mitigation activities, but Christian Aid's policy and research capacity means that the programme should also be able to support significant innovation.

One apparent gap in the existing system is the lack of connection of disaster-affected communities with the national early warning and disaster preparedness system. Strengthening these connections seems a promising area for increased focus in future programming. It should be noted that some high quality analysis has been carried out on how to build linkages between community and state EWS (see Batta and Gubbels, Action Research EWS Report, 2010), so a useful first step would be to re-visit the recommendations of this report with a view to implementing them; further action research to update the analysis could be commissioned as required.

A further gap evident in the few PCDs we have seen is any analysis that considers how and why vulnerability varies between households in the commune or how actions might be tailored to the needs of different socio-economic groups. Were the project able to strengthen its PVCA methodology to consider such issues, it may be able to add real value here also.

#### What is the theory of change?

Once the changes that the programme wants to bring about are more clearly defined, it is proposed that the next step should be to articulate the programme theory of change more explicitly than has been done to date. As stated in the methodology chapter, the evaluators were at first confronted with eight different programme logframes and decided as a first step to work with CA to construct a theory of change in the form of hypotheses that could be tested. Since most of these have been found not, in fact, to hold there is clearly a need to re-think the theory of change. This does not need to be cast in stone and could usefully be tested periodically for plausibility.

Given that the key problems in the current theory of change have been between the input/activity levels on the one hand and the output level on the other, it will be critical to ensure that the theory of change informs all levels of the programme and is used by all staff and partners. It will also be important that project partners and CA country staff collect relevant monitoring data on how the anticipated linkages in the theory of change actually work out in practice and that they feel empowered to communicate upwards any evidence that the theory of change is not in fact holding true. The theory of change needs to be underpinned by a robust system for collecting and using M&E data as described in chapter two.

### **4.3 Recommendations**

#### **4.3.1 Cross-Cutting Recommendations**

Given the analysis in the previous section, the first two recommendations of this evaluation are as follows:

**Recommendation one: Ground programme design more explicitly in an understanding of the specific strengths and weaknesses of the existing national system for supporting DRR and promoting resilience; and of entry points and opportunities for CA to add value.**

**Recommendation two: Articulate the new programme theory of change more explicitly, use it actively to inform programme design at all levels and test it periodically for plausibility.**

Looking at the existing programme design, the evaluators have a further set of cross-cutting recommendations as to how the programme could be improved going forward:

**Recommendation three: Focus the interventions geographically and ensure stronger linkages between village, communal and national levels.**

The strategic re-think recommended above should involve an assessment of the appropriate balance of work between village, communal and national levels and how to ensure that work at different levels is more joined up. The exact geographical focus and spread will depend on the objectives that emerge from this strategic rethink. However the evaluation team believes that the current spread of 19 focus villages scattered across 3 Provinces and 10 communes has many drawbacks, including cost inefficiency and limited influence in any one commune; and few if any real advantages in practice. If the project continues to aim for an impact at commune level it would make much more sense to choose to work more actively at commune level in a very small number of focus communes.

**Recommendation four: Strengthen collaboration with other NGOs.**

Many others are carrying out similar activities in the same zones as BDRC. Enhanced technical exchange, cross-learning and collaboration could help the programme identify its niche and work out how together NGOs can help bring about change.

**Recommendation five: Strengthen project documentation and information management**

Documentation of the BDRC/PPA projects has been very weak. Critical gaps include the lack of any record of beneficiary selection criteria, missing beneficiary lists and the lack of records of complaints received. This is a problem not only for evaluation, but also surely for on-going monitoring and learning.

**Recommendation six: Review focus villages/communes periodically**

Partners are very aware that in some villages progress has been very slow. However, the project continues to offer identical resourcing to these villages as to others. Either the project should identify the constraints and offer more intensive support to overcome them; or if the constraints are insurmountable, shift resources to villages where there they are likely to add more value.

**Recommendation seven: Review the skills mix of CA and partner staff**

The type of objectives that BDRC/PPA has set itself seem to require analytical / action research type skills, rather than just programme management ones. Would it be useful to include staff with these skills within partner teams (e.g. by having action researchers working at commune level alongside community workers) or alternatively to expand partnerships?

**Recommendation eight: Review partnerships**

Current partners are effective operational NGOs, but CA could usefully consider whether these partnerships are sufficient to achieve programme objectives, which include influencing the authorities and contributing to systemic reform. Is there a need to extend partnerships beyond operational NGOs to include Burkina universities/ research institutes / think tanks / advocacy NGOs? Should CA develop direct partnerships with communal authorities?

**Recommendation nine: Work collaboratively with other NGOs to address the problem of excessive per diems**

The project is currently paying per diems to Government employees to attend training or participate in workshops and to carry out certain key project-related work in villages. This seems to be a serious constraint to building a sustainable system, but is impossible to challenge alone.

**Recommendation ten: Give the project a more memorable name in local languages**

This may seem a minor point, but stakeholders argued that the lack of a pronounceable and memorable name underlay the problems of beneficiary confusion between projects, which in turn made attribution of results so difficult.

The following section sets out specific recommendations related to each element of the programme (broken down by hypothesis)

**4.3.2 Hypothesis one**

**Recommendation eleven: Strengthen PVCA methodology.**

In a revamped PVCA, analysis of household level drivers of vulnerability and the variations in vulnerability between households could usefully be included (e.g. through the use of household economy analysis, wealth ranking or similar tools).

**Recommendation twelve: Promote continued broad participation of all sections of the community after the PVCA**

As flagged in chapter three, the high level of participation seen during the PVCA falls away rapidly in subsequent phases of the project cycle. In particular, in light of the limited alternative funding opportunities open to communities, it will be important to ensure that prioritisation of actions for funding by CA is carried out in a more participatory way.

**Recommendation thirteen: Consider a range of approaches to awareness-raising, in particular make more use of radio**

Where awareness-raising is a key element of programming (e.g. in the promotion of accountability) consider a range of approaches beyond community worker visits to individual remote villages. In particular consider greater use of creative radio programming. Consider partnerships with specialist NGOs such as Population Media Center or Farm Radio; and for villages without radio coverage consider alternatives, such as short-range radio programming on market days.

**Recommendation fourteen: Carry out a KAP baseline**

If raising awareness remains a key programme objective, then a baseline that assesses knowledge, attitudes and practices (KAP) will be indispensable for effective M&E, as it is almost impossible to assess such changes through reliance on recall.

### **Recommendation fifteen: In support of innovative practices move beyond training courses**

Introduction of innovations such as joining up community and state EWS or introducing HAP is challenging. Modalities of support should be designed in collaboration with authorities/communities, but might include:

- making resource people available to communes for a year or more to support planning/programme design/monitoring
- developing practical tools for implementation

#### **4.3.3 Hypothesis two**

### **Recommendation sixteen: Strengthen beneficiary selection processes**

At a minimum, basic checks and balances should be introduced. These might include: clarification of targeting criteria; posting these criteria in a public place in the village for transparency; review by project staff of a sample of selection decisions; and ensuring access of all community members to a complaints mechanism. If resources were to be substantially increased, a more robust participatory community targeting process could usefully be developed to manage the increased risks of elite capture.

### **Recommendation seventeen: Improve effectiveness of nutrition support**

The support to preparation of enriched porridge has been less effective than most other activities, because the ingredients for promoted recipes are often either unavailable locally or too expensive. The project might consider one of two approaches: either working in partnership with specialists in nutrition and local plants/tree products to promote recipes that use ingredients that are truly local and affordable in project zones; or, if this proves impossible, doing more to promote access of mothers of young children to income-generating opportunities that enable them to pay for ingredients.

### **Recommendation eighteen: Ensure that female-headed households benefit from activities that build resilience of agricultural activities**

The quantitative study identified a significant under-representation of female-headed households amongst beneficiaries of contour bunds. It will be important to analyse the reasons for this and to design activities in a way that overcomes any constraints to the participation of these households.

#### **4.3.4 Hypothesis three**

### **Recommendation nineteen: Assess the opportunities and constraints to uptake of innovations in particular villages and for different groups of people**

Participatory analysis of the opportunities and constraints to uptake of innovations, including by the most vulnerable would enable the project to distinguish

- activities that can be easily multiplied even by the most vulnerable (because the main constraint is lack of knowledge)
- activities that can be easily multiplied but where the most vulnerable face particular constraints and need special support
- and activities where the main constraints are financial / material and where expecting substantial spontaneous multiplication is unrealistic.

#### **4.3.5 Hypothesis four**

**Recommendation twenty: Ensure that village EW committees operate as part of the overall EW system.**

Work with the committees and communal technical services and other EWS actors to:

- obtain official recognition for village committees as part of EW system
- define their key activities and linkages with other actors in the system

**Recommendation twenty-one: Follow up on recommendations of BDRC EWS Action Research report (Batta and Gubbels, 2010)**

#### **4.3.6 Hypothesis five**

**Recommendation twenty-two: Provide intensive support to HAP committees and partners in each zone to develop locally adapted HAP tools**

**Recommendation twenty-three: Ensure that these tools not only enable the committee President to complain about partner staff, but also enable community members to complain in the case of serious abuses by the committee.**

- Clarify as to how and to whom a community member may complain. Best practice would be for two or three options to be available, one of whom may be the village chief.
- Raise awareness widely about the right to complain and the mechanism. Do not rely solely on the HAP committee to pass this message; make use of other channels of communication, such as local radio.

**Recommendation twenty-four: Post (in relevant local languages) key information in a central point in village:**

- programme objectives
- annual budget for village, key activities
- beneficiary selection criteria and number of beneficiaries of each activity
- beneficiary lists
- complaints mechanism and key phone numbers

(see link with recommendation sixteen)

#### **4.3.7 Hypothesis six**

**Recommendation twenty-five: Clarify the roles, responsibilities and expected behaviours of each partner and set these out in a partnership agreement.**

This should be agreed and signed by all partners and should be monitored to ensure that all partners feel that others are abiding by it and adding maximum value.

**Recommendation twenty-six: Identify and address the reasons for delays in financial transfers from CA to partners.**

**Recommendation twenty-seven: Support cross-learning workshops between partners involved in the programme.**

**Recommendation twenty-eight: Further analyse and address the sources of communication challenges between partners / CA Burkina and CA London identified in the course of this evaluation.**

## **ANNEX 1: PEOPLE MET DURING QUALITATIVE WORK**

Réunion du 21/10/2013 à l'ODE

Nom	Prénom	Structures/Fonction
Diendéré	Gustave (M)	ODE/Coordonnateur
Yaméogo	Arouna (M)	ODE/Chef de projet PPA
Ouédraogo	Julien (M)	RMARP/Assistant technique
Ouédraogo	Edouard (M)	RMARP/Superviseur BBDC-PPA

Réunion du 22/10/2013, village de Gargono, comité BDRC/PPA

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Tindano	Philippe (M)	Président BDRC
Namoutougou	Ramata (F)	Trésorière BDRC
Boulgou	Moussou(F)	SG/adjt BDRC
Wabogo	Yénibouo (M)	SG BDRC
Komadi	Koka (M)	Président PPA
Waboiga	-	Secrétaire information BDRC et Secrétaire PPA

Réunion du 22/10/2013, village de Gargono , Comité SAP

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Lankouandé	Kanfri (M)	Président
Waboa	Nignedepa (M)	Secrétaire
Lalgo	Djingri (M)	Trésorier
Tindano	Philippe (M)	membre

Réunion du 23/10 2013, Gorom Gorom, ATAD

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Zango	Constant(M)	Président
Amadou	Ahmadi Boulo (M)	Superviseur ATAD
Ouédraogo	-	Coordonnateur PPA
Altini	Daouda (M)	Président CSB communal
Sana	Ousséni (M)	ATAD
Kielem	Dimitri (M)	Coordonnateur Projet Résilience ECHO

Réunion du 23/10/2013, village de BIDI

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Amadou	Amadou	Président CVD
Amadou	Assane	Conseiller municipal

Réunion du 24/10/2013, village de Kindibo, comité BDRC

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Ouédraogo	Moumini (M)	Trésorier
Ouédraogo	Lamine (M)	Chargé à l'information
Ouédraogo	Rasmané (M)	Secrétaire général
Sawadogo	Mathieu (M)	Président
Sawadogo	Limata (F)	Trésorière adjointe

Réunion du 24/10/2013, Direction Provinciale de l'élevage

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Barry	Idrissa (M)	Directeur provincial

Réunion de restitution de la première phase du 25/10/2013, ODE

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Yaméogo	Arouna (M)	Chef de projet PPA/ODE
Ouédraogo	Julien (M)	Assistant technique RMARP
Ouédraogo	Edouard (M)	Superviseur BDRC/PPA/RMARP
Kouraogo	Ousséni (M)	ATAD

Réunion de restitution de la première phase du 25/10/2013 à Christian AID

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Kabré	Assèta(F)	CA
Kaboré	Marc (M)	CA

Réunion du 26/11 2013 à Gorom Gorom, ATAD

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Zango	Constant (M)	Président ATAD
Amadou	Ahamadi Boulo(M)	Superviseur ATAD
Ouédraogo	André M)	superviseur ATAD

Réunion du 26/11/2013, village Boulel

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Boureima	Bouba (M)	Président CVD/Membre comité de sélection
Issa	Moussa(M)	Membre comité de gestion banque de céréales
Moussa	Aldiouma(M)	Membre comité de gestion banque de céréales
Ahmad	Tidjiane(M)	Bénéficiaire fosse fumière et cordons pierreux

Personnes rencontrées le 27/11/2013, commune de Gorom Gorom

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Diallo	Moussa	Maire de Gorom Gorom
Ly	Amadou (M)	Coordonnateur de l'association pour le développement communautaire de Gorom (ADCO)
Ba	Ousmane (M)	Président Comité de suivi à la base (CSB) Markoye
Altini	Daouda (M)	Président comité de suivi à la base) CSB gorom Gorom
Amadou	Boureima (M)	Chargé équipe d'animation Projet Sauvegarde de l'Environnement (PSEN), REACH ITALIA

Réunion du 27/11/2013, village de Korzéna

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Adama	Kibso(M)	Président CVD/Membre comité de sélection
Maiga	Moussa(M)	Président comité sélection/vice président CVD
Gounabi	Ousséni (M)	Trésorier adjoint CVD/comité HAP

Personnes rencontrées le 28/11/2013, Dori

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Tamboura	Ahmadou(M)	Maire de Seytenga
Maiga	Abdoulaye(M)	Maire de Falangoutou
Laguemvaré	Thomas(M)	Sous bureau régional PAM, Sahel
Diallo	Ismael(M)	Coordonnateur Projet d'assistance des populations hôtes des zones de réfugié, ONG Help, ancien coordonnateur de Africare au Zondoma
Traoré	Sy Joseph(M)	Préfet de Falangoutou

Réunion du 28/11/2013, village de Gargono, comité HAP

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Waboa	Wadori (M)	Membre
Lalgou	Ramata (F)	Membre
Namounou	Lemana (M)	Membre
Namoutougou	Ramata (F)	Membre
Nadinga	Maraline (F)	Membre

Réunion du 28/11/2013, village de Gargano, comité SAP

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Lankoandé	Kanfri (M)	Président
Ouabera	Neyedguipa (M)	Secrétaire
Lalgo	Guingri (M)	Trésorier
Tindano	Philippe (M)	Membre
Dabourgou	Poèna (F)	Trésorière adjointe
Guibougou	Farma (F)	Secrétaire adjointe

Réunion du 29/11/2013 à la mairie de Arbinda

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Maiga	Issouffi (M)	1 <sup>er</sup> adjoint maire

Réunion du 29/11/2013, Gaick Ngota, comité BDRC et HAP

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Ourba	Moumini (M)	Président comité BDRC
Sawadogo	Adama (M)	Secrétaire BDRC et CVD
Ouno	Ousséni (M)	Membre BDRC
Badini	Ousséni (M)	Membre BDRC
Badini	Zénabou (F)	Secrétaire adjointe BDRC
Kindo	Zénabou (F)	Secrétaire à l'information BDRC
Ono	Roukiatou (F)	Responsable des femmes CVD
Ouédraogo	Aminata (F)	Membre BDRC
Maiga	Alimata (F)	Chargée à l'information BDRC
Ouédraogo	Awa (F)	Trésorière adjointe BDRC
Maiga	Marata (F)	Présidente site maraîcher

Réunion du 02/12/2013, Kèra Douré, comité BDRC

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Barry	Aminata (F)	Membre
Ouédraogo	Daouda (M)	Magasinier BDRC
Gansoré	Bibata (F)	Vice-présidente BDRC
Ouédraogo	Moumini (M)	Secrétaire warantage

Réunion du 03/12/2013, Tougo , bénéficiaires des AGR

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Belem	Rakiata (F)	Bénéficiaire
Sawadogo	Colette (F)	Bénéficiaire
Sawadogo	Mariam (F)	Bénéficiaire

Réunion du 03/12/2013, village de Tougo, Comité BDRC

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Ouédraogo	Alidou (M)	Président
Rouamba	Rasmané (M)	Secrétaire

Réunion du 03/12/2013, village de Masboré , comités HAP et BDRC

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Guïro	Daouda (M)	Président comité BDRC
Sawadogo	Delwendé (M)	Membre comité HAP
Guïro	Fati (F)	Trésorière adjointe BDRC
Guïro	Souleymane (M)	Président CVD
Sawadogo	Ramata (F)	Présidente des femmes

Personnes rencontrées le 03 et le 04/12/2013 à Gourcy

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Barry	Idrissa (M)	Directeur provincial de l'élevage
Wangré	Amadou (M)	Coordonnateur Association Monde Rural (AMR)

Réunion du 06/12/2013 à Christian Aid

Nom	Prénom	Structure/Fonction
Pasteur Bazié		ODE
Yaméogo	Arouna (M)	Superviseur PPA/ODE
Ouédraogo	Mathieu (M)	Président RMARP
Ouédraogo	Edouard (M)	Superviseur BDRC/PPA/RMARP
Sanou		Suivi évaluation RMARP
Kabré	Assèta (F)	Christian Aid
Bassinga	Philippe (M)	Christian Aid

## ANNEX 2: RESPONDENTS TO QUANTITATIVE SURVEY

This table shows the number of respondents in each category in each village, coded as follows:

--- Randomly selected from population (not as a direct beneficiary) = 2

--- Direct beneficiary of enriched porridge = 11

--- Direct beneficiary of gardening = 12

--- Direct beneficiary of improved seeds = 13

--- Direct beneficiary of contour bunds = 14

--- Direct beneficiary of livestock (goat/sheep) = 15

--- Direct beneficiary of livestock (chicken) = 16

--- Combinations indicate people who were surveyed for more than one activity eg. 113 indicates a person who benefited from both enriched porridge and improved seeds

Bén/Non bén	SENO : Tamboura, Traoré			SOUM : Sawadogo		OUDALAN : Yacouba : Ouro Hesso, Korzena, Oursi Hamadou : Boulel, Bidi, Markoye Almadi : Tin Akkof, Dambam, Markoye							NORD : George, Sidoine et Lingani						Total	
	Bandiédaga	Kargono	Seytenga	Boulkéssé	Gaïk- goata	Dambam	Bidi	Boulél	Tin- Akkof	Korzéna	Markoye	Ouro- Hesso	Oursi	Kéléguem	Kéra Douré	Kindibo	Lintiba	Masboré		Tougo
2	4	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	6	5	5	10	4	4	6	5	4	5	4	92
11	3	3	4	4	3		1	3	4	2		2				2		2	6	39
12	3				3	6				5		4		4	4					29
13	3	6	3	3	1	7	3	4	7	4	7	3	7	1	1	1	2	3		66
14	4	5		3	4		4	6						5		3	8			42
15				4	3									4	6	4	2	4	5	32
16																	2	1		3
113			1																	1
114							1													1
125															3					3
134														1		2				3
141								2												2
<b>Total</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>313</b>